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ARTICLES 
DEFINING PATENT QUALITY 
Christi J. Guerrini* 
 
Depending on whom you ask, the state of U.S. patent quality is either 
dismal or decent, in decline or on the upswing, in need of intervention or 
best left alone.  Absent from the ongoing debate about the quality of U.S. 
patents, however, is much thoughtful discussion about what constitutes a 
patent’s “quality” in the first place.  What features of a patent make it 
“good” in quality, what features make it “bad” in quality, and whose 
opinion matters?  Surprisingly, scholars and policymakers have shown little 
interest in these questions.  Yet their answers are critical to the direction of 
the patent agenda because they dictate how to measure patent quality and, 
consequently, how to evaluate the extent of the so-called patent quality 
“crisis” as well as the effectiveness of quality reforms. 
The broad aim of this Article is to draw attention to the definition of 
patent quality as an important subject of scholarly inquiry.  Its more 
specific aim is to call for a return to first principles and begin the process 
of operationalizing the meaning of patent quality.  It does so by analyzing 
the concept using a methodology applied in the business literature of 
quality management.  The implications of this work include a fundamentally 
different approach to patent quality’s meaning that is essentially the inverse 
of the conventional way of thinking about the concept.  That is, instead of 
defining a good-quality patent as one that, at a minimum, satisfies the 
existing legal standards of patentability, the legal standards of patentability 
(among other things) should be adjusted and applied to reflect good patent 
quality.  Following this new approach, I propose a formula for assessing 
patent quality and identify the most important variable in that formula:  the 
quality “dimensions” along which patent quality can be said to rise and 
fall.  Identifying these dimensions is the necessary first step in a process 
that ultimately aims to shift the focus of reform efforts from the limited goal 
of increasing the number of legally valid patents toward the more relevant 
goal of increasing the number of good-quality patents. 
 
 
*  IP Fellow, IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.  For their comments on earlier drafts of this 
Article, I wish to thank Chris Buccafusco, Ralph Clifford, Edward Lee, Phillip Page, Chris 
Schmidt, David Schwartz, and participants of PatCon 3, the 2013 Works-in-Progress IP 
Colloquium, the Chicago-Kent College of Law Faculty and Junior Faculty Workshops, and 
the 2013 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Depending on whom you ask, the state of U.S. patent quality is either 
dismal or decent, in decline or on the upswing, in need of intervention or 
best left alone. 
On one side of the debate are those who believe that the universe of U.S. 
patents is populated by an unacceptably high and perhaps growing number 
of low-quality—or “bad”—patents.1  Generally speaking, bad patents are 
 
 1. Ronald J. Mann & Marian Underweiser, A New Look at Patent Quality:  Relating 
Patent Prosecution to Validity, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2012) (“No respected 
observer would deny the significance of the difficulties facing the patent system or that the 
central problem is the decline in the quality of patents.” (citation omitted)); R. Polk Wagner, 
Understanding Patent Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2144 (2009) (noting 
that “most academics likely believe that patent quality could (and should) be higher” and that 
those less familiar with the patent system are convinced that the pervasiveness of low-quality 
patents is a serious problem). 
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bad because they carve out of the public domain and deter others from 
practicing inventions that are in some way undeserving of patent protection.  
In addition, some bad patents are bad because they cause those working in 
related fields to unnecessarily restrict their operations or engage in 
expensive licensing transactions or lawsuits to protect themselves.  A less 
tangible but equally worrisome consequence of bad patents is that they 
undermine the integrity of the patent system, including the institutions and 
professionals that sustain it. 
Although the patent community has long been concerned with the 
dissemination of bad patents,2 in the past several decades, activity around a 
so-called “quality crisis” has intensified.3  The legal academy, practitioners, 
and industry members have loudly complained about the quality of U.S. 
patents,4 and even those less familiar with the patent system appear 
convinced that low patent quality is a serious problem.5  Responding to 
these concerns, in the past decade, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) has identified patent quality as a pressing institutional issue and has 
launched a number of initiatives intended to improve it.6  And most 
 
 2. See, e.g., 1 ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS 9 (1869) [hereinafter 1869 REPORT] 
(expressing concern with the seeming proliferation of patent practitioners who were “more 
solicitous about the number [of patents] than the quality of those which they obtain”); 1 
ANN. REP. COMMISSIONER PATENTS 4 (1868) [hereinafter 1868 REPORT] (“I apprehend that 
much of [the] apparent [increase in patents] has arisen from the allowance of patents that 
never should have been granted.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the 
Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY 
L.J. 61, 63 & n.2 (2006) (collecting articles criticizing the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
for issuing “so-called ‘bad’ or improvidently granted patents”); Beth Simone Noveck, “Peer 
to Patent”:  Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 123, 123 (2006) (“There is a crisis of patent quality.”); John R. Thomas, Collusion 
and Collective Action in the Patent System:  A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 305, 321 (“The patent quality crisis is worthy of our attention.”); Aaron Homer, 
Comment, Whatever It Is . . . You Can Get It on eBay . . . Unless You Want an Injunction—
How the Supreme Court and Patent Reform Are Shifting Licensing Negotiations from the 
Conference Room to the Courtroom, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 235, 275 (2007) (“The assertion that 
the PTO is overwhelmed, under-funded, and issuing too many low quality patents has 
universal acceptance.”). 
 4. See supra notes 1, 3; see also Chris Mercer, Panel Contribution, in Sara-Jayne 
Adams, Quality Is the Key to a Bright Patent Future, INTELL. ASSET MGMT., Apr./May 2008, 
at 55, 63–64 (“[T]he quality of patents issued by the USPTO has declined . . . .”); Manny W. 
Schecter & Marian Underweiser, Panel Contribution, in Adams, supra, at 55, 65 (“IBM 
believes that patent quality has suffered in recent years . . . .”). 
 5. James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 44; 
Editorial, Patently Absurd, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2006, at A14; Kevin Drum, 
Chart of the Day:  Patent Quality Declining, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 21, 2011), 
http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2011/09/chart-day-patent-quality-declining 
(asserting that, on average, the quality of U.S. patents has become “noticeably worse over 
the past decade”); accord Wagner, supra note 1, at 2144 (“[A]s the patent system grows in 
importance—by both increasing in size and in visibility to the modern knowledge 
economy—the importance of this public perception will increase.”). 
 6. See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, THE 21ST CENTURY STRATEGIC 
PLAN 5 (2003), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/stratplan_
03feb2003.pdf (stating that patent quality is the PTO’s “highest priority” and is therefore 
emphasized in every component of its strategic plan); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
2010–2015 STRATEGIC PLAN (2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/
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recently, Congress passed the most sweeping patent legislation in at least 
half a century7 based in part on the promise that it will improve patent 
quality.8 
Yet there is a vocal minority that rejects this pessimistic account.  
Largely relying on PTO data, this group contends that patent quality has 
stayed the same or even has improved in recent years.9  Finally, there is a 
third faction that agrees that the number of bad U.S. patents is excessive, 
but does not find this state of affairs particularly troubling given the low 
percentage of patents that are ever litigated or licensed.10 
Notably absent from the ongoing debate about the quality of U.S. patents 
is much thoughtful discussion about what constitutes a patent’s quality in 
the first place.  What features of a patent make it “good” in quality, what 
features make it “bad” in quality, and whose opinion matters?  Surprisingly, 
scholars and policymakers have shown little interest in these questions. 
 
USPTO_2010-2015_Strategic_Plan.pdf (stating that a critical priority of the PTO is to 
improve the quality of issued patents); Notice of Roundtables and Request for Comments on 
Enhancement in the Quality of Patents and on United States Patent and Trademark Office 
Patent Quality Metrics, 75 Fed. Reg. 22,120 (Apr. 27, 2010) (announcing that the PTO will 
conduct two roundtables to obtain public input on patent quality improvement and 
measurement). 
 7. This legislation is the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 
Stat. 284 (2011). 
 8. See 155 CONG. REC. S2,706 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(asserting that the bill that would eventually become the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
would improve patent quality); David Kappos, Using a Data-Driven Approach for Quality 
Improvements, USPTO.GOV(Jan. 22, 2013),  http://www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/using_
a_data_driven_approach (“Improving patent quality was a key element in building bipartisan 
support for the America Invents Act . . . .”). 
 9. See, e.g., Brief for the Bos. Patent Law Ass’n As Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Genentech, Inc., on the Merits at 2–6, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech Inc., et al., 549 U.S. 
118 (2007) (No. 05–608), 2006 WL 2126862, at *2–6 (arguing that “there is no plague of 
bad patents” and that the PTO has become better at rigorously examining patent applications, 
resulting in improvements in the quality of issued patents); Jonathan Barney, Panel 
Contribution, in Adams, supra note 4, at 55 (opining that U.S. patent quality “is as high, if 
not higher, now than it was five years ago”); Patrick Doody, The Patent System Is Not 
Broken, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Dec. 2006, at 10, 15 (discrediting claims that patent 
quality has decreased in recent years and asserting that the available evidence shows that 
patent quality “has stayed about the same, or actually increased, over the past 20 years”); Jon 
Dudas, Panel Contribution, in Adams, supra note 4, at 57 (asserting that the PTO’s 
“objective measurements tells us that patents today are of higher quality than they were 10 or 
even five years ago”); James E. Malackowski & Jonathan A. Barney, What Is Patent 
Quality?  A Merchant Banc’s Perspective, 43 LES NOUVELLES 123, 125–27 (2008) (asserting 
that some of the statistical evidence the authors analyzed suggests that patent examination 
quality, and therefore patent quality, has either remained steady or has even improved over 
the past five years); Susan Walmsley Graf, Comment, Improving Patent Quality Through 
Identification of Relevant Prior Art:  Approaches To Increase Information Flow to the 
Patent Office, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 495, 500–01 (2000) (citing the PTO’s internal 
quality assessment audits and data collected by the University of Houston Law Center on 
patent invalidity decisions as indicators that “patent quality may be increasing slightly”). 
 10. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1497 (2001) (claiming that because so few patents are ever asserted, it makes 
more economic sense for society to make detailed validity determinations in those few cases 
than to invest additional resources examining patents that will never be asserted). 
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The absence of work in this definitional space may mean one of three 
things.  First, it may reflect that there already exists a consensus on patent 
quality’s meaning.  Admittedly, few seem to dispute that a good patent at 
least satisfies the legal standards of patentability.  That is, a good patent, at 
a minimum, describes a new, useful, and nonobvious invention covering 
eligible subject matter in such full and definite terms that others can 
understand how to make and use it.11  But a review of the literature reveals 
considerable diversity of opinions as to whether something more than legal 
validity is required for a patent to qualify as a good-quality one.12  Far from 
there being a consensus on patent quality’s meaning, the matter is 
controversial.13 
Alternatively, the modest attention paid to patent quality’s meaning may 
reflect an understanding that the choice of definition has no real-world 
significance.  No one has yet established that the definitional choice is 
inconsequential, however, and so that seems a weak basis for declining to 
study it.  In any event, the assumption is wrong; the choice of definition, in 
fact, has important normative implications.  For one, it provides the basis 
for determining what “counts” as a good or bad patent.  By establishing a 
metric for quality, the definition makes it possible to determine the extent of 
any so-called quality crisis and the effectiveness of policies aimed at 
containing it.14  It also provides a criterion for evaluating the hundreds of 
policies that have been proposed to improve the functioning of the patent 
system.  If a proposed policy is sure to reduce patent quality, it should be 
rejected unless it is expected to produce substantial offsetting benefits.  And 
a policy whose principal purpose is to enhance patent quality should be 
rejected if it is unlikely to actually achieve that purpose. 
Third, the lack of interest in patent quality’s meaning may reflect an 
assumption that developing a common definition of patent quality is an 
impossible task.  If there ultimately is no “best” definitional choice, the 
analysis may not be worth the effort.  Again, however, the analysis has not 
yet been performed and so concluding that it would be futile is premature.  
In any event, as described below, there are some elements of the definition 
on which consensus possibly can be achieved.15 
The broad aim of this Article is to draw attention to the definition of 
patent quality as an important subject of scholarly inquiry.  Its more specific 
aim is to call for a return to first principles and begin the process of 
 
 11. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112(a)–(b) (2012). 
 12. See infra notes 27–35 and accompanying text. 
 13. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 4, at 55 (“Patent quality is an elusive term that seems to 
mean different things to different people.”); Dennis Crouch, What Can Patent Applicants Do 
To Improve Patent Quality?, PATENTLYO (Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/
2013/01/what-can-patent-applicants-do-to-improve-patent-quality.html (“Patent ‘quality’ has 
many different meanings.”). 
 14. Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability:  An 
Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2067 (2007) 
(“[T]he extent of the problem [of patent quality], and its impact, is not well understood.”). 
 15. Cf. Frequently Asked Questions, PAT. QUALITY INDEX, https://www.law.upenn.edu/
blogs/polk/pqi/faq.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (asserting that patent quality is not so 
subjective that it cannot meaningfully be quantified). 
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operationalizing the meaning of patent quality.  In so doing, it hopes to 
bring clarity and give direction to the patent quality agenda. 
Part I considers the preliminary question of whether examining the 
meaning of patent quality is a worthwhile endeavor.  Concluding that it is, 
Part II looks to the business discipline of quality management for analytical 
guidance.  Quality management studies the evaluation, measurement, and 
strategic improvement of the quality of business products and processes.16  
Its scholars have described a multistep approach to constructing a 
meaningful definition of quality to support firms’ strategic quality 
programs.17  This approach is based on identifying the quality “dimensions” 
that emerge from a consideration of the needs and preferences of 
stakeholders. 
Part III applies this approach to the question of patent quality.  In 
particular, it describes a formula for understanding patent quality.  The next 
two sections identify the most important variable in that formula:  the 
quality dimensions.  First, Part IV describes the basic needs and preferences 
of four major stakeholders in patent quality.  These stakeholders are the 
PTO, the courts, patentees, and the public. 
Part V then describes five dimensions of quality that emerge from the 
stakeholder analysis.  These dimensions are:  (1) a patent’s probable 
validity; (2) clarity of the patent; (3) faithfulness of the patent to the scope 
of the invention; (4) social utility of the patented invention; and 
(5) commercial success of the patented invention.  The first three 
dimensions describe the patent document; the last two dimensions describe 
the patented invention.  Although a patent is a distinct “thing” from its 
underlying invention, it may be impossible as a practical matter to separate 
the two for purposes of understanding patent quality because the patent is 
intended to “capture” the invention.  This Article therefore embraces an 
expansive understanding of patent quality that takes into account attributes 
of both patents and the inventions they describe. 
Part VI summarizes the implications of this work.  Broadly, it 
demonstrates that the meaning of patent quality is far richer than most in the 
patent community recognize.  Going forward, commentators and 
policymakers are urged to be more thoughtful—as well as transparent—
about their definitional choices.  This work also provides a common 
vocabulary to use during patent quality conversations that will help make 
those conversations more productive. 
More specifically, this work calls on commentators and policymakers to 
adopt a fundamentally different approach to patent quality’s meaning that is 
essentially the inverse of the conventional way of thinking about the 
concept.  The conventional approach defines a good-quality patent as one 
that at a minimum satisfies the existing legal standards of patentability.  The 
new approach puts “first things first” and asks what it means for a patent to 
be good quality without regard to the existing legal standards.  It then calls 
 
 16. See infra note 56. 
 17. See infra Part II.B. 
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for a recalibration of the standards (among other things) to reflect the 
meaning of good patent quality that emerges from that analysis.  Ultimately, 
following the new approach shifts the focus of reform efforts from the 
limited goal of increasing the number of legally valid patents toward the 
more relevant goal of increasing the number of good-quality patents. 
I.  WHY DEFINE PATENT QUALITY? 
At the outset, it is important to resolve whether developing a meaning 
and theory of patent quality is a worthwhile endeavor.  It may be that 
dissonance and ambiguity as to patent quality’s definition is an 
unobjectionable condition—or even that it is the preferred one.18 
This Part concludes that it is neither, given the placement of quality-
improvement efforts at the top of the patent reform agenda.  Surely, where 
an issue has achieved a place of such political prominence, it is fair, even 
advisable, to probe the basis for identifying the issue as a problem in the 
first place.  Moreover, it is difficult to have productive conversations about 
patent quality when so many participating in the conversation do not define 
what they mean by that concept or, when they do, adopt vague or 
conflicting meanings.  For at least these reasons, the meaning of patent 
quality merits a close look. 
A.  Opinions on the Meaning of Patent Quality Are Diverse, 
Underdeveloped, and Ambiguous 
Although patent quality has been identified as a problem in the United 
States since the early years of the Patent Office,19 the meaning of the 
concept has so far escaped serious scrutiny.  Since that time, many of those 
who have written on the state of patent quality have done so without 
explicitly defining the concept.20  Instead, those commentators either have 
taken the meaning of the concept as a given—that is, they have assumed 
that the audience shares their understanding of the concept—or they have 
left it to the audience to discern their intended meaning from context.  
When that meaning can be discerned, commentators have rarely attempted 
to justify it.21  The assumption seems to be that no justification is necessary 
because the meaning of the concept is uncontroversial. 
 
 18. Cf. Gerald F. Smith, The Meaning of Quality, 4 TOTAL QUALITY MGMT. 235, 235 
(1993) (“Academics often over-state the importance of defining one’s terms.”). 
 19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 20. See, e.g., Scott R. Boalick, Patent Quality and the Dedication Rule, 11 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 215, 267, 269 (2004) (referring to patent quality at various points in terms of 
certainty, validity, and breadth without explicitly defining it); David J. Kappos & Stuart 
Graham, The Case for Standard Measures of Patent Quality, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV., Mar. 
20, 2012, at 19, 19 (advocating for standard measures of patent quality without defining the 
concept). 
 21. See, e.g., James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll:  An 
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 
202 (2006) (defining, without further explanation, “quality patents” as “patents with well-
defined property rights that are neither overinclusive nor underinclusive”). 
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If that were true, one would expect commentators to recite or suggest 
only one definition.  An examination of the literature, however, reveals 
considerable definitional variability.22  To be sure, there seems to be a 
consensus that a good-quality patent is at least one that satisfies all of the 
statutory conditions of patentability.  It is the duty of PTO examiners to 
evaluate whether a patent application complies with these conditions, and in 
deference to that evaluation, all issued patents are presumed valid.23  The 
presumption can be overcome by a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence,24 however, and those who challenge validity are in fact frequently 
successful.25  Because invalid patents, by definition, never should have 
issued, there is a shared understanding that a good-quality patent is at least 
a legally valid one.26  Implicit in that understanding, though, is the 
assumption that the validity standards have been—and even can be—
calibrated and consistently applied to reflect good patent quality in the first 
place. 
While there is general agreement that validity is relevant to quality, 
scholars, industry members, the PTO, and the public disagree on whether 
validity is the exclusive standard by which to judge patent quality.  Many 
members of the patent community believe that it is.27  But more than a few 
 
 22. Some of these definitions are summarized in DAN PRUD’HOMME, DULLING THE 
CUTTING-EDGE:  HOW PATENT-RELATED POLICIES AND PRACTICES HAMPER INNOVATION IN 
CHINA 22–24 (2012), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/47617/1/MPRA_
paper_43299.pdf. 
 23. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012). 
 24. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242–43 (2011) (affirming 
that a challenger must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence). 
 25. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated 
Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (finding an invalidity rate of 46 percent for written, 
final validity decisions by the federal district courts and the Federal Circuit from 1989 to 
1996); Mann & Underweiser, supra note 1, at 8 (finding an invalidity rate of 60 percent for 
Federal Circuit decisions from 2003 to 2009, excluding cases in which validity decisions 
were vacated and remanded); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An 
Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 390 (2000) (finding an 
invalidity rate of 33 percent for combined judge and jury decisions for patent cases that went 
to trial between 1983 and 1999). 
 26. Nevertheless, the legal standards are not always equally emphasized when patent 
quality is being assessed.  For example, those who believe software patents are “bad” are 
concerned that such patents protect algorithms that fall outside the scope of protected subject 
matter defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 or are so ambiguous that, in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 112, 
it is impossible to understand the contours of the invention. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, 
Making Software Patents Transparent and Understandable:  Begin by Determining Whether 
Software Is Patentable, PATENTLYO (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/
10/making-software-patents-transparent-and-understandable-begin-by-determining-whether-
software-is-patentable.html.  By contrast, those who denounce patents on things like the 
crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich are usually complaining that these inventions are 
either not new or are obvious in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. See Mark Lemley et 
al., What To Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10. 
 27. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct 
Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 748 (2009) (stating that patents that meet the validity 
requirements “are considered to be of good quality”); Ben McEniery, Physicality and the 
Information Age:  A Normative Perspective on the Patent Eligibility of Non-physical 
Methods, 10 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 106, 150 (2010) (defining “[a] quality patent [as] 
one likely to meet the requirements of novelty, inventiveness and sufficiency of 
2014] DEFINING PATENT QUALITY 3099 
appear to embrace a more complex view according to which a good-quality 
patent must possess additional characteristics.  For example, some 
commentators view the concept of value as relevant to patent quality, while 
others are adamant that it is not.28  Other commentators use value as a 
proxy for quality29 or even use the terms interchangeably.30 
For the most part, the PTO has adopted a definition of patent quality that 
equates it with patent validity.  The agency’s quality metrics, for example, 
are focused on identifying issued patents that, upon further review, are 
invalid, as well as applications that bear markers of invalidity.31  Yet 
elsewhere the PTO has suggested that it has a higher standard for quality.  
For example, the PTO recently proposed rules—the stated purpose of which 
is to improve patent quality—that would require patent applicants to use 
standardized claim templates, provide glossaries of terms, and designate 
default dictionaries.32  Notably, each of these rules promotes clarity of 
claim terms well beyond what is required for a patent to be valid. 
The range of opinions on the question of patent quality is on full display 
in a 2008 article in the professional journal Intellectual Asset Management 
that asked nineteen patent professionals around the world to define patent 
 
specification, and thus not likely to be found invalid if challenged”); Lee Petherbridge, 
Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 175 (2006) (defining “[q]uestionable, or low quality, 
patents” as those that fail to meet the standards for patentability); John R. Thomas, The 
Responsibility of the Rulemaker:  Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration 
Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 730 (2002) (“Quality patents are, in short, valid 
patents.”). 
 28. These opposing views are represented by Sivaramjani Thambisetty, who defines 
quality in terms of a patent’s technological significance and commercial importance, 
Sivaramjani Thambisetty, Patents As Credence Goods, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 707, 
709–10 (2007), and Polk Wagner, who writes that a patent’s quality is distinct from and 
should not be confused with its value, Wagner, supra note 1, at 2138–39. 
 29. See, e.g., John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 
18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 987, 997 (2003) (explaining that “patent quality and value are 
interwoven in inextricable ways” such that “value can probably be characterized as quality 
plus other factors”). 
 30. See, e.g., Patent Quality Improvement:  Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, 
the Internet & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) 
(statement of Rep. Howard Berman) (“The quality of a patent is synonymous with the value 
of that patent . . . .”); Mark Liang, Chinese Patent Quality:  Running the Numbers and 
Possible Remedies, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 478, 491 (2012) (referring to the 
quantification of patent quality in terms of “assessing the objective ‘value’ of a patent”); 
Malackowski & Barney, supra note 9, at 129  (“[P]atent quality from a merchant banc’s 
perspective is . . . synonymous with value.”). 
 31. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ADOPTION OF METRICS FOR THE ENHANCEMENT 
OF PATENT QUALITY FISCAL YEAR 2011 (2010), available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/
init_events/qual_comp_metric.pdf.  The first two metrics involve subjective determinations 
of individual applications and patents based on “clear error” as to the patent’s validity; the 
third and fourth metrics involve subjective determinations of individual applications based 
on compliance with best practices; the fifth metric is a global, statistical representation of 
quality-related events in the prosecution of patent applications; and the sixth and seventh 
metrics measure subjective perceptions of examination quality. Id. at 4–14. 
 32. Request for Comments on Preparation of Patent Applications, 78 Fed. Reg. 2960 
(Jan. 15, 2013). 
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quality.  Some respondents equated quality solely with validity,33 while 
others noted a place in the quality calculus for additional attributes.34  For 
example, one respondent defined patent quality to “cover an invention that 
is meaningful; creates commercial advantage; has well-written claims, 
maximising the coverage; and has been filed and prosecuted correctly.”35 
The job of sorting out these diverse opinions is complicated by the fact 
that they typically are expressed in a conclusory fashion.  One sentence, or 
a few, is all the textual space that typically is devoted to the definition.36  
Further, the attributes identified as relevant sometimes lend themselves to 
multiple interpretations, none of which is specified.  For example, those 
who suggest that value is relevant to patent quality do not always specify 
whether they are referring to the value of the patent or the value of the 
invention it describes.37  Yet these two values are distinct.38 
Adding yet another layer of ambiguity is the fact that one may have high 
quality standards for the patents that she owns but relatively low quality 
standards for patents owned by others, or vice versa.  Those who offer 
definitions of patent quality do not often clarify the populations that are the 
intended definitional targets.39  And it otherwise can be difficult to 
determine from context whether a proposed definition of patent quality is 
personal to the author and her business interests or is intended for broader 
application. 
B.  Clarity and Consensus on the Meaning of Patent Quality  
Promotes Sound Policymaking 
The coarseness, ambiguity, and diversity of opinions on patent quality’s 
meaning create several challenges for policymakers.  First, it is difficult to 
determine whether there exists a quality problem in need of remediation 
when those participating in the conversation understand patent quality to 
mean different things and do not use a common language to communicate 
their views.  Again, this point is well illustrated in the 2008 article featuring 
 
 33. See, e.g., Schecter & Underweiser, supra note 4, at 65 (“Patent quality refers to how 
well a patent meets the legal criteria for patentability.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Lars Kellberg & Reza Green, Panel Contribution, in Adams, supra note 4, 
at 61 (“[A] quality patent is one that has claims of broad enough scope to provide a useful 
swath of exclusivity to the patent holder . . . .”). 
 35. Stephen Potter, Panel Contribution, in Adams, supra note 4, at 64. 
 36. For example, a scholarly article devoted to identifying mechanisms that impact 
patent quality discusses the question of its meaning in six sentences. See Wagner, supra note 
1, at 2138–39.  Two of the six sentences set forth a positive definition; the remaining four 
sentences state that patent value is irrelevant to quality. Id.  An exception to the summary 
nature of most definitions can be found in Graf, supra note 9, at 499–500 (describing three 
basic approaches to the definitional question that focus on validity, certainty, and value). 
 37. See, e.g., Potter, supra note 35, at 64 (defining a quality patent in terms of whether it 
“creates commercial advantage” without identifying whether that advantage is a result of the 
legal rights that attach to the patent, the patented invention, or both). 
 38. See infra Parts IV.C, V.D–E. 
 39. For instance, most of the patent professionals who contributed to the 2008 article in 
Intellectual Asset Magazine did not identify their intended definitional targets. See Adams, 
supra note 4. 
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the opinions of nineteen prominent patent professionals.  Some respondents 
asserted that U.S. patent quality has declined in recent years, while others 
asserted that it has improved or stayed the same.40 
As that article suggests, some persons define bad quality narrowly so that 
the universe of bad-quality patents is much smaller than, and therefore not 
as troubling as, the universe of bad-quality patents constructed by those 
who define bad quality more expansively.  The former group is less likely 
to view patent quality as an issue that merits intervention.  The latter group 
may agree that intervention is warranted, but its members will likely have 
different ideas about the best way to proceed.  Because they disagree on 
what quality means, they disagree on which policies should be developed 
and implemented for the purpose of improving quality.  They also disagree 
on how to measure whether those policies, once implemented, are working 
and so should be continued or are failing and so should be canceled. 
At bottom, the controversy surrounding the meaning of patent quality is a 
species of what is known as problem definition.  Policy scholars describe 
problem definition as “the strategic representation of situations”; in 
essence, how the problem is defined dictates the extent of the problem and 
its solution.41  Many legal reforms have been shaped by strategic problem 
definition, including those related to punitive damages and class action 
suits.42  Patent law is also no stranger to issues of problem definition.  Most 
recently, the debate over the problem of so-called patent “trolls” has turned 
in part on the definition of a troll, with expansive definitions suggesting that 
trolls do more social and economic harm than they do when more narrowly 
defined.43 
Whether the problem is patent trolls or patent quality, it is inefficient to 
spend resources developing and implementing solutions to a problem 
without clarity on what exactly is the problem.  It is also less likely that the 
 
 40. Compare Mercer, supra note 4, at 63–64 (noting that quality has declined), and 
Schecter & Underweiser, supra note 4, at 65 (same), with Dudas, supra note 9 (stating that 
quality has improved), and Kellberg & Green, supra note 34 (noting that quality is 
approximately the same). 
 41. DEBORAH A. STONE, POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON 106 (1988). 
 42. See, e.g., Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Punitive Damages, Change, and the 
Politics of Ideas:  Defining Public Policy Problems, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 71, 95 (addressing 
the politics of the alleged problem defined as the “‘explosion’ of punitive damage awards” 
(quoting S. 565, The Product Liability Fairness Act of 1995:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce, and Tourism of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
Science, and Transp., 104th Cong. 415 (1995) (statement of Theodore B. Olson, attorney))); 
Nan S. Ellis, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005:  The Story Behind the Statute, 35 J. 
LEGIS. 76 (2009) (considering the impact of problem definition on the enactment of the Class 
Action Fairness Act of 2005). 
 43. See David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-practicing 
Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 440–41 (2014) (criticizing a study by 
James Bessen and Michael Meurer placing the direct costs of patent trolls—also known as 
nonpracticing entities (NPEs)—at $29 billion on grounds that the study’s definition of an 
NPE is overbroad, noting that “[o]bviously, narrowing the definition of non-practicing entity 
would lower Bessen & Meurer’s $29 billion figure”). See also generally John M. Golden, 
“Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112 n.7 (2007) (“[A] widely 
accepted definition of a patent troll has yet to be devised.”). 
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solutions that are implemented will be effective.  Today, there are hundreds 
of policy proposals on the patent reform table.  Collectively, these proposals 
seek to change the legal rules, administrative procedures, institutional 
responsibilities, regulatory mechanisms, and behavioral norms that operate 
at virtually every level of the patent system.  Individually, these proposals 
include: 
 changes to the legal standards of patentability and their 
interpretation;44 
 changes to the examining capacity of the PTO and the competence 
standards of its examiners;45 
 changes to the procedures according to which applicants submit and 
the PTO evaluates patent applications;46 
 changes to the procedures according to which patents are challenged 
and enforced;47 
 changes to the regulations governing those who draft (or “prosecute”) 
patents;48 and 
 changes to the incentives that affect the behavior of patentees.49 
Each of these proposals is directed at improving the operation of the U.S. 
patent system, and many of them are directed at doing so, specifically and 
primarily, by improving patent quality.  But there are insufficient resources 
 
 44. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 39, 64–72 (2008) (proposing a redefinition of the obviousness standard using 
economic principles). 
 45. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many As Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast:  
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 
606–09 (1999) (arguing that the PTO should raise the salaries of senior examiners to induce 
them to stay and increase the training of junior examiners). 
 46. See, e.g., Request for Comments on Preparation of Patent Applications, 78 Fed. Reg. 
2960 (Jan. 15, 2013) (seeking public comment on practices by patent applicants that will 
potentially improve patent quality, such as use of a standardized template for each claim and 
designation of a default dictionary); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks To Create a Better 
Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763, 784–86 (2002) (calling for mandatory technical 
methods of disclosure for software patents); Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking 
Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 61–63 (2007) (arguing that the 
PTO should provide patentees the option to “gold-plate” their patents by subjecting them to a 
more vigorous examination at the PTO). 
 47. See, e.g., Kesan, supra note 46, at 776–83 (arguing for establishing a new 
preissuance opposition proceeding before the PTO); Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 46, at 
59–61 (arguing that the presumption of validity that attaches to issued patents should be 
weakened). 
 48. See, e.g., Ralph D. Clifford, Thomas G. Field, Jr. & Jon R. Cavicchi, A Statistical 
Analysis of the Patent Bar:  Where Are the Software-Savvy Patent Attorneys?, 11 N.C. J.L. 
& TECH. 223 (2010) (arguing that entry requirements to the patent bar should be expanded to 
include more computer scientists); Corey B. Blake, Note, Ghost of the Past:  Does the 
USPTO’s Scientific and Technical Background Requirement Still Make Sense?, 82 TEX. L. 
REV. 735, 757–63 (2004) (arguing for the elimination of the technical qualification 
requirement or, alternatively, the expansion of recognized disciplines). 
 49. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 1, at 2165–72 (arguing for reforms that would increase 
applicants’ incentives to file high-quality patents and decrease their incentives to file low-
quality patents). 
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to adopt every promising policy that is proposed, and it would be irrational 
to do so given that each proposal presents a unique cost-benefit profile.  In 
developing a strategy to optimize patent quality, it is necessary to choose 
among the policies on the reform table.  What standards should govern that 
decision? 
There are obviously many factors to consider when deciding whether to 
adopt or reject a particular reform, including its economic, political, and 
practical feasibility.  When it comes to policies affecting the patent system, 
an additional factor that should be considered is impact on patent quality.  
That is because good patents are almost universally considered to be a 
crucial output of a properly functioning patent system.50  And rightly or 
wrongly, there is widespread concern that the universe of U.S. patents 
includes an unacceptable number of bad patents.51  As summarized by one 
scholar, “There is perhaps no patent issue with a higher profile than patent 
quality.”52 
A proposed policy that is intended to improve the functioning of the 
patent system therefore should be rejected if it is sure to reduce patent 
quality, unless it provides substantial offsetting benefits.  And a proposed 
policy whose principal purpose is to enhance patent quality should be 
rejected if it is unlikely to actually achieve that purpose.  Where a policy 
satisfies these standards, then the decision whether to adopt or reject it 
should be determined in reference to other criteria. 
Finally, the meaning of patent quality dictates how to evaluate the 
effectiveness of policies after their implementation.  There is a maxim of 
business management that says, “[I]f you can’t measure it, you can’t 
manage it,” and so it is with quality.53  If the number of bad patents is found 
to increase rather than decrease after a specific policy is implemented, this 
is an important fact to know in deciding whether to continue or cancel the 
reform.  But the metric cannot be used without agreement at the outset as to 
what constitutes a bad patent.54  In other words, we cannot count the 
number of good and bad patents until we know what counts as a good or 
bad patent.  Moreover, that calculation will not accurately reflect a policy’s 
 
 50. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, USPTO Issues 
Examination Guidelines To Better Define the Scope of Patent Protection and Thereby 
Improve Patent Quality, Release 11-11 (Feb. 9, 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/
news/pr/2011/11_11a.jsp (“Patent quality is essential to the proper functioning of the patent 
system.”). 
 51. See supra notes 1, 3–8 and accompanying text. 
 52. Wagner, supra note 1, at 2172; see also Adams, supra note 4, at 55 (“Ask anyone in 
the world of patents to name their top three issues and you can be sure that the importance of 
quality will be mentioned.”); Interview with Howard Shelanski, Director, FTC Bureau of 
Economics, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2012, at 7 (answering, “Well, I think that anything that 
could improve patent quality is extremely important,” when asked whether any recent patent 
law changes were of particular interest to the FTC). 
 53. David A. Garvin, Building a Learning Organization, in HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW 
ON KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 70 (1998). 
 54. Cf. Carol A. Reeves & David A. Bednar, Defining Quality:  Alternatives and 
Implications, 19 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 419, 419, 436–39 (1994) (explaining that difficulties 
defining quality in the business context had led to inconsistent and contradictory empirical 
results regarding the relationships between quality and market share, costs, and profits). 
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performance if there is a mismatch between the definition that is the basis 
for the metric and the definition that is the basis for the policy. 
II.  THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:  PRODUCT QUALITY 
The concept of patent quality has a long history of loose interpretation 
lacking analytical rigor.  If the meaning of that concept is to give useful 
direction to policymakers, a more systematic approach to understanding it is 
needed.  The question this Article now turns to is:  what should that 
approach look like? 
For help with this question, I looked to the literature of quality 
management.  Having emerged as a business discipline in its own right over 
the past sixty years,55 quality management focuses on evaluating, 
measuring, and thinking strategically about the quality of products and 
services provided by firms.56 
Over time, many have attempted to define what quality means in the 
business world.  The result has been a proliferation of definitions, none of 
which has proven fully satisfactory.57  In the mid-1980s, however, 
management scholars began working to identify common themes in these 
competing definitions.58  In the process, they developed a general approach 
to understanding quality’s meaning in a commercial context that is widely 
cited in the management literature today.59 
The work of management scholars in this definitional space provides a 
helpful roadmap to those interested in defining patent quality.  For one, 
their scholarship is mature, representing over thirty years of analysis—more 
if the presynthesis literature is included.60  Given that management scholars 
have sought to answer the same conceptual question as the one addressed 
here, it makes sense to consult their work.61  Indeed, it would seem unwise 
not to do so.  Accordingly, although the definitional approach described by 
management scholars is not the only methodology that can or perhaps even 
 
 55. See generally Kevin Dooley, The Paradigms of Quality:  Evolution and Revolution 
in the History of the Discipline, 5 ADVANCES MGMT. ORG. QUALITY 2 (2000) (describing the 
history of quality management as a discipline). 
 56. S. THOMAS FOSTER, MANAGING QUALITY:  INTEGRATING THE SUPPLY CHAIN 17–18 
(5th ed. 2013). 
 57. David A. Garvin, What Does “Product Quality” Really Mean?, MIT SLOAN MGMT. 
REV., Fall 1984, at 25, 26; accord Reeves & Bednar, supra note 54, at 436–39 (describing 
the strengths and weaknesses of various proposed definitions). 
 58. See, e.g., Garvin, supra note 57, at 26–28; Reeves & Bednar, supra note 54, at 435–
36. 
 59. See, e.g., JAMES R. EVANS & WILLIAM M. LINDSAY, MANAGING FOR QUALITY AND 
PERFORMANCE EXCELLENCE 44 n.6 (9th ed. 2012) (citing the definitional work of Garvin and 
another management scholar, Gerald Smith); FOSTER, supra note 56, at 3–5, 39–40 
(describing the definitional work of management scholars David Garvin and Genichi 
Taguchi). 
 60. See generally Dooley, supra note 55. 
 61. Cf. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Economics and Sociology:  The Prospects for an 
Interdisciplinary Discourse on Law, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 389, 405 (“[I]t is generally easier for 
scholars to make connections between their work and the work in other disciplines if the 
practitioners of the other disciplines are attempting to address the same substantive 
problems.”). 
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should be applied to the question of patent quality’s meaning, it is a sound 
place to begin the analysis. 
A.  Conceptual Quality 
That analysis begins with the understanding that quality is fundamentally 
a concept.62  Concepts can be distinguished according to their linguistic 
category, and the concept of quality falls under the category of a property 
attribute.63  That is, quality refers to a characteristic of some object or 
entity, such as a thing, a state, or a process.64 
While some property attributes like weight and color are directly 
measurable, quality is not.65  That is because quality is not a physical 
feature of a thing.66  Rather, it is an abstract feature.67  Assessing the quality 
of some thing may involve measuring its attributes—or “dimensions”—but 
those measurements serve only as a proxy for the thing’s quality.68 
Particular attributes of a thing can be better or worse proxies for its 
quality.  The measurements of those attributes therefore reflect the thing’s 
quality only to the extent that the attributes are good proxies for quality.  If 
they are bad proxies, their measurements are useless.  This point 
underscores the need to take great care in identifying the quality dimensions 
that serve as the basis for judging a thing’s quality. 
Another important feature of conceptual quality is its indication of the 
relationship between a thing’s quality dimensions and an evaluative 
standard or criterion.  The standard may be an objective one reflecting the 
ideal prototype that people generally conceive for the thing.69  Or the 
standard may be a subjective one based on the interests, needs, preferences, 
or values of individuals or groups who use or otherwise have an interest in 
the thing.70 
B.  Product Quality 
These two aspects of conceptual quality are captured in the following 
definition of commercial quality that appears in the management literature:  
“Quality is the goodness or excellence of any product, process, structure or 
other thing that an organization consists of or creates.  It is assessed against 
accepted standards of merit for such things and against the interests/needs 
of producers, consumers and other stakeholders.”71  Although the definition 
covers both commercial products and processes, patents are more akin to 
 
 62. See Smith, supra note 18, at 236. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 241. 
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things than events and so the remainder of this Article will focus on the 
more relevant application of the definition to commercial products. 
Consistent with the distinction between conceptual quality and quality 
dimensions, the first part of the definition equating quality with excellence 
is careful to describe the concept as transcendent in nature rather than by 
reference to specific characteristics.72  The second part clarifies that quality 
is a function of any objective standards that might exist for a thing and the 
subjective standards of stakeholders.  Of course, it may be impossible to 
identify any truly objective quality standards for a product beyond what is 
already obvious, like freedom from defects that prevent the product from 
performing.  That is because people have different needs and preferences 
with respect to the products they encounter that depend on their relationship 
to those products.  In any event, because objective quality standards are, by 
definition, universally accepted, those standards necessarily will emerge in 
an analysis of subjective quality standards.73  An attempt to identify 
relevant quality standards therefore may be described as a single inquiry 
into the common and unique standards of stakeholders. 
Another way to understand the product-quality definition is to frame it as 
a three-step process.74  First, identify the relevant stakeholders and their 
common and unique standards for the quality of a product as dictated by 
their individual interests and needs.  Second, identify the dimensions of 
quality that emerge from the stakeholder analysis.  A particular 
stakeholder’s perspective might translate into one quality dimension or 
many, and the same quality dimension may or may not be preferred by 
multiple stakeholders.  Third, measure the product’s merit with respect to 
each dimension and consolidate those partial scores into a final judgment on 
quality. 
Strategic quality management focuses on the first two steps and attempts 
to maximize the total quality score across an entire product category at the 
lowest marginal cost.75  For any given product, each quality dimension 
helps define a minimum universe of desirable features of the product 
category. But it is not always possible or cost-effective for manufacturers to 
attempt to optimize quality along every dimension, and certainly not at the 
same time.76 
 
 72. But see Garvin, supra note 57, at 25 (identifying the transcendent meaning of quality 
as one of several major approaches to the definition rather than, as Smith contends, the one 
true meaning of quality). 
 73. See David A. Garvin, Competing on the Eight Dimensions of Quality, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Nov.–Dec. 1987, at 101, 104 (explaining that some subjective preferences “are so 
universal that they have the force of an objective standard”). 
 74. See Smith, supra note 18, at 236. 
 75. See Garvin, supra note 57, at 33. 
 76. Garvin, supra note 73, at 108.  In the 1980s, for example, Steinway & Sons focused 
on developing a reputation for high-quality, handmade pianos that are distinctive in sound 
and style, while Yamaha built a reputation for quality based on reliability and conformance 
to specifications. See id.  The dimensions on which each company strategically chose to 
compete (at the expense of other dimensions) are called “quality niches.” See id. at 104; see 
also Garvin, supra note 57, at 33. 
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This is where the definitional work becomes especially important.  By 
taking the time to identify a product’s dimensions associated with quality, a 
firm can tailor its operations around exactly—and only—those functions 
and tasks that will maximize quality along the selected niches.  As 
explained by a leading scholar in this area, firms that wish to compete in 
quality must “first develop a clear vocabulary with which to discuss quality 
as a strategy.”77  It is only after breaking down the concept of quality into 
manageable parts that firms can develop a competitive plan for quality.78 
C.  Application 
Synthesizing the various definitions of product quality that have been 
offered over the years, management theorists have identified several 
perspectives on product quality that are associated with essentially three 
different stakeholder groups:  manufacturers, consumers, and the public. 
The manufacturing-oriented group is comprised of design engineers and 
operations managers.79  Their perspective on quality is straightforward:  a 
quality product is one that conforms to design and manufacturing 
specifications.80  All products involve specifications for parts and materials, 
among other things, and these specifications are normally expressed in 
terms of an allowed range from a target or “center.”81  A product that 
deviates beyond this range is, according to the manufacturing-based 
approach, low in quality.82 
This perspective dominated the early modern quality management 
movement.83  Over time, however, management scholars came to 
appreciate the limitations of a meaning of quality based solely on a 
manufacturing perspective.  An S-Class Mercedes that conforms to all 
applicable standards is good quality according to manufacturing 
stakeholders, but so is—to no less a degree—a fully conforming Chevette.84  
That these two kinds of cars would receive equal quality ratings reveals a 
 
 77. Garvin, supra note 73, at 103. 
 78. See id.; cf. Kristie W. Seawright & Scott T. Young, A Quality Definition Continuum, 
26 INTERFACES 107, 107 (1996) (explaining that effective quality management programs 
“require consensus or cross-functional goals that must be based on a shared understanding of 
quality definitions”). 
 79. See Garvin, supra note 57, at 27–28. 
 80. Id. at 28. 
 81. Garvin, supra note 73, at 105. 
 82. See Garvin, supra note 57, at 31. 
 83. See Reeves & Bednar, supra note 54, at 421–22 (explaining the early 1900s 
“American system of manufacturing” according to which the “key to quality was 
conformance to specifications”).  The “zero-defects” theory of quality developed by Philip 
Crosby in the 1960s, for example, is consistent with this perspective. See Zero 
Defects, LOCKHEEDMARTIN.COM, http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/100years/stories/zero-
defects.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (explaining the success of the “zero defects” 
program at Lockheed Martin during the 1960s). 
 84. Garvin, supra note 57, at 28. 
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major shortcoming of the manufacturing approach:  a product that is 
perfectly “in spec” may still fail to satisfy user needs and preferences.85 
In appreciation of this shortcoming, in the mid-twentieth century, the end 
user emerged as the most important quality stakeholder in most industries.86  
The user-based approach to quality defines quality as “fitness for use” 
according to which higher-quality products are those that best satisfy user 
needs and preferences.87  Of course, there are several problems with this 
approach, including the difficulty of aggregating idiosyncratic views in 
order to produce meaningful definitions of quality for designers and 
marketers.88 
Most recently, a third stakeholder in product quality has risen to 
prominence:  the public.  The social-loss approach to product quality 
defines it in terms of “the loss a product causes to society after being 
shipped, other than any losses caused by its intrinsic functions.”89  Such 
losses result from variability in product functions as well as harmful side 
effects to bystanders, including uncompensated loss to others.90  For 
example, a car that does not start in cold weather is low quality according to 
this approach because the owner suffers a financial loss in car repairs and 
the owner’s employer suffers a financial loss in reduced work performed by 
the tardy employee.91 
The second step of the definitional process is to identify the quality 
dimensions that emerge from the stakeholder analysis.  The manufacturing 
and user perspectives generate eight basic quality dimensions of 
commercial products:  conformance to specifications; performance features; 
secondary features; reliability; durability; serviceability; perceived quality; 
and aesthetics.92  The social-loss approach generates two additional quality 
dimensions:  variability in product function and side effects.93  Together, 
these ten dimensions can be used to define the quality of a product, 
although they are not necessarily exclusive or mandatory in every case.94 
The third step is to measure a particular product’s performance along 
each of the relevant dimensions and to consolidate these partial scores into 
 
 85. See id.; Laura B. Forker, Quality:  American, Japanese, and Soviet Perspectives, 5 
ACAD. MGMT. EXEC. 63, 73 (1991). 
 86. Reeves & Bednar, supra note 54, at 423–27 (“The most pervasive definition of 
quality currently in use is the extent to which a product or service meets and/or exceeds a 
customer’s expectations.”). 
 87. QUALITY CONTROL HANDBOOK, at 2.2 (Joseph M. Juran et al. eds., 3d ed. 1974). 
 88. Garvin, supra note 57, at 27. 
 89. GENICHI TAGUCHI, INTRODUCTION TO QUALITY ENGINEERING:  DESIGNING QUALITY 
INTO PRODUCTS AND PROCESSES 1 (1986). 
 90. Id. at 2. 
 91. JIJU ANTONY & MIKE KAYE, EXPERIMENTAL QUALITY:  A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO 
ACHIEVE AND IMPROVE QUALITY 18 (2000). 
 92. Garvin, supra note 73, at 104–07; Garvin, supra note 57, at 29–32. 
 93. TAGUCHI, supra note 89, at 2. 
 94. Fewer or additional dimensions may be required, depending on the specific product 
category under consideration.  For example, computer software may implicate two additional 
quality dimensions of integrity (the extent to which unauthorized access can be controlled) 
and portability (the ease of transfer between environments). See Garvin, supra note 73, at 
108. 
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an overall judgment of the product’s quality.  While this last step must be 
performed to evaluate a particular product, only the first two steps are 
required to develop strategies for improving the quality of entire product 
categories. 
III.  THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK:  PATENT QUALITY 
This Part translates the management literature on defining product quality 
into a framework for defining patent quality.  It begins by explaining why 
the insights of management theorists are particularly relevant to the patent 
context—and by identifying limits to the analogy.  It then proposes a basic 
formula for assessing patent quality that can be used to identify efficient 
strategies for maximizing overall patent quality. 
A.  From Product Quality to Patent Quality 
As described at the outset of Part II, the work of management scholars in 
defining product quality provides a helpful roadmap to those interested in 
defining patent quality.  This is especially so given the similarities between 
manufacturing a commercial good and a patent that render the definitional 
work on product quality particularly relevant to the patent context.  The 
typical process for manufacturing a good—also known as “realizing a 
product”—begins when a design engineer, usually in response to 
information about user needs and preferences, drafts specifications for a 
specific product.95  The product is then manufactured in accordance with 
those specifications.96  Afterwards, the product is subjected to quality-
control procedures to ensure that its parts and operation fall within the 
accepted range of deviation.97  If it does, the product is shipped for sale to 
end users.  If it does not, the product may be destroyed or repaired, 
depending on the cost of the fix.  Post-sale, a user may discover that, 
despite the best efforts of the manufacturer, the product suffers from a 
defect that renders it inoperable or otherwise worthless.  When that occurs, 
the user may discard the product or ask the manufacturer or a third party to 
repair the defect. 
The process for “manufacturing” a patent follows a similar path.  That 
process begins when an inventor, typically through a patent attorney or 
agent, drafts an application for a patent that is intended to comply with the 
“specifications” set forth in the patent laws and the administrative rules that 
interpret them.  The application includes two main parts:  the specification 
and a set of claims.98  The specification contains a detailed description 
(typically including drawings) of the invention and explains how it solves a 
particular problem.99  The patent then concludes with a set of claims.100  
 
 95. See CORRADO POLI, DESIGN FOR MANUFACTURING:  A STRUCTURED APPROACH 3–6 
(2001) (explaining the stages of product realization). 
 96. See id. at 6. 
 97. See id. at 7. 
 98. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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Each claim is a technical sentence that describes a unique invention, 
although all of the claims set forth in a patent relate to the same inventive 
concept.101  Because each claim of a patent is separately evaluated to 
determine its legal validity and infringement,102 it is probably more 
accurate to refer to “claim quality” than “patent quality.”  Nevertheless, this 
Article follows the convention of using the term patent quality to refer 
generally to the quality of a patent’s claims. 
After the inventor’s agent files the application, the PTO assigns one or 
more examiners to evaluate the application to determine whether it 
complies with the relevant legal requirements.103  The examiner and agent 
then engage in what is typically a long process of refinement according to 
which the examiner usually rejects one or more claims for 
noncompliance.104  When this occurs, the agent responds by trying to 
convince the examiner that the rejection is improper, by amending or 
canceling the rejected claims, or by appealing the rejection.105  In the best-
case scenario for the inventor, this refinement process ends when the 
examiner approves one or more claims and the PTO issues a patent setting 
forth the approved claims.106  The patent owner (or her competitor) may 
later discover that the patent suffers from a defect that renders one or more 
of its claims legally invalid or commercially worthless.  When this occurs, 
the owner may abandon the patent or attempt to cure the defect at the PTO 
or in court.107 
So described, each patent claim can be understood as a kind of product 
manufactured cooperatively by an inventor’s agent and the PTO that 
ultimately has passed a kind of quality assurance review conducted by the 
PTO.  Indeed, of all the forms of intellectual property, the manufacturing 
analogy is the most applicable to patents.  While copyrights and some 
 
 101. See id. (stating that the claims must describe what the inventor “regards as his 
invention”).  For example, one patent claim may describe a new widget, and a second claim 
may describe a method of using the new widget. 
 102. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, LLC, 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (“[I]nfringement and validity analyses must be performed on a claim-by-claim 
basis.”). 
 103. 35 U.S.C. § 131; 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a)(1) (2013); MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE chs. 700, 2100 (8th ed. 2012) (setting forth the procedures according to which 
the PTO evaluates patents for conformance with the legal standards of patentability). 
 104. See Dennis Crouch, Likelihood of Office Action Rejections, PATENTLYO (June 15, 
2010), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/06/likelihood-of-office-action-rejections.html 
(finding that, based on an examination of 20,000 published patent applications, between 77 
and 93 percent of applications across all PTO Technology Units were initially rejected and 
between 27 and 47 percent were finally rejected). 
 105. The examination process is described in chapter 700 of the MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 103.  The appeals process is described in chapter 1200. 
 106. 35 U.S.C. §§ 131, 151. 
 107. A patent owner can affirmatively disclaim any part of her patent, or any part of its 
term, 37 C.F.R. § 1.321, or let the patent lapse by failing to pay maintenance fees, 35 U.S.C. 
§ 41(b)(2).  A patent owner can also attempt to cure defects by, among other things, seeking 
a reissue or advocating a construction of the patent that will avoid the defects. See infra 
notes 139, 244 and accompanying text. 
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trademark rights are automatic,108 patents only issue following a rigorous 
and prolonged process of collaborative engineering and examination. 
While there are notable similarities between products and patents, 
however, there are also notable differences.  First, the identity of a product 
is typically self-contained.  The identity of a widget, for example, is based 
on its attributes as a widget.  The identity of a patent, however, is closely 
linked to the identity of the invention it describes.  Indeed, the existential 
relationship between the two is so close that the patent is said to “capture” 
the invention.109 
Yet the patent has attributes—legal, economic, and social—distinct from 
the invention. The patent is therefore a different ontological “thing” than the 
invention.110  Consequently, the quality of a patent does not exactly 
correspond with the quality of the invention it describes.  Still, it may be 
impossible as a practical matter to separate the two.  That is because the 
nature of the invention—its subject matter, utility, and significance—will 
inevitably play a role in opinions on the quality of a patent describing the 
invention.111 
The second major difference between commercial products and patents 
stems from their different functions.  Because a commercial product is a 
form of property, a variety of legal rights and obligations necessarily attach 
to it.112  But to most observers, a product’s legal function will usually be 
secondary to its physical function:  to do something.  A patent claim also 
has a physical function of describing a particular invention, but to most 
observers, that function will usually be secondary to the patent’s legal 
 
 108. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (providing a federal cause of action for infringement of 
unregistered trademarks); 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (recognizing copyright ownership without any 
filing or notice by the owner). 
 109. Daniel A. DeVito & Michael P. Dierks, Exploring Anew the Attorney-Client 
Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine in Patent Litigation:  The Pendulum Swings Again, 
This Time in Favor of Protection, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 103, 129 (1994) (“In drafting the patent 
application, the scope of the legal right embodied in the invention is captured in writing.”); 
Greg H. Gardella & Emily A. Berger, United States Reexamination Procedures:  Recent 
Trends, Strategies and Impact on Patent Practice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 381, 
406 (2009) (“A well-constructed patent claim that captures the invention more precisely and 
accurately will be more valuable because it is more likely to be found valid.”). 
 110. See Michael J. Madison, Law As Design:  Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381, 383 (2005) (“Traditionally, the notion of the ‘legal’ thing has 
been practically and conceptually distinct from the ‘real’ thing.  In patent law, for example, 
there is the actual device that the inventor developed, and there is the legally distinct thing 
that the patentee owns, which the law knows as the patent claim.”). 
 111. Just as the visual appearance of a coffee cup may affect one’s opinion of a 
photograph of that cup, the features of an invention may affect one’s opinion of the patent 
claim describing the invention.  For example, most observers will perceive a photograph of a 
white Styrofoam cup differently than a photograph of an ornate teacup.  Similarly, the patent 
community typically perceives software and business method patents differently than, for 
instance, patents on mechanical inventions. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1495 (“The 
criticism [allowing bad patents] is particularly strong in specific industries, notably software 
and Internet ‘business method’ patents.”). 
 112. See James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 294 (2013) 
(explaining that, for each thing in existence, property laws inform who has authority to 
determine how it may be used). 
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function:  to exclude others from doing something.113  Thus, the primary 
function of a hammer is to drive a nail, while the primary function of a 
patent on a hammer is to exclude others from making, using, and selling the 
hammer. 
Third, most products are or can be mass-produced.  This means that they 
exist in the world as multiple copies, and one’s ownership of any particular 
product usually does not interfere with someone else’s ownership of a copy 
of that product. Assuming sufficient supply and access, my ownership of 
one copy of a particular hammer does not preclude you from owning 
another copy of that hammer. 
By contrast, patent claims are, by definition, unique.114  Each claim 
describes a thing or activity that, within certain parameters, has never 
before been disclosed.115  A claim is legally invalid, and therefore ceases to 
exist, if it is discovered to be an identical or substantially similar copy of a 
preexisting disclosure.116  In this way, the preexisting disclosure does not 
just frustrate one’s ability to own a patent on it; the preexisting disclosure 
precludes such ownership altogether.  If I own a patent disclosing a 
particular hammer, you cannot own a patent disclosing the same hammer.  
But I cannot patent the hammer if it was previously disclosed.  In that case, 
the rights to make, use, and sell the hammer already are “owned” by the 
public. 
These differences do not necessarily compel departing from the 
definitional approach described by management theorists.  But they do 
suggest that the appropriate conception of patent quality is a broad one that 
takes into account both the features of patents and the inventions they 
describe.  Part V returns to this point. 
In addition, patents’ prominent social identity suggests that when 
determining which stakeholder’s views should take precedence in cases of 
conflict, greater weight should be placed on the needs and preferences of 
the public as opposed to manufacturers and owners.  This conclusion is 
consistent with the fundamental goal of the patent system, which is a 
utilitarian one of promoting innovation for the benefit of the public.117  This 
goal is embodied in the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which empowers Congress to provide for a system of granting 
patents “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”118  
 
 113. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 545, 546 n.5 (2012) (collecting articles criticizing the prominence of disclosure 
as a justification for the patent system). 
 114. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (requiring patented inventions to be new). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id.; id. § 103 (requiring patented inventions to be nonobvious). 
 117. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1597 (2003) (“[C]ourts and commentators widely agree that the basic purpose of 
patent law is utilitarian . . . .”); Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law As Public Law, 20 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 41, 50 (2012) (“[A]ny benefit that patents confer on individuals is secondary 
to the public’s interest in our patent system.”); Ted M. Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of 
“Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 528 (2014) (“[T]here is nearly universal 
agreement that the patent system’s primary goal is to promote innovation . . . .”). 
 118. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Interpreting the Intellectual Property Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
consistently held that the primary purpose of the patent system is to benefit 
the public.119  In 1858, for example, the Court recognized that the “true 
policy and ends of the patent laws” are embodied in the Intellectual 
Property Clause:  “the benefit to the public or community at large was . . . 
doubtless the primary object in granting and securing th[e patent] 
monopoly.”120  In 1917, the Court emphasized that it had never modified its 
understanding “that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the 
creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents but is ‘to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts.’”121  And in 1944, the Court succinctly 
stated, “It is the public interest which is dominant in the patent system.”122 
Nevertheless, the Court has consistently acknowledged that the patent 
laws are intended to promote private interests in addition to public ones.123  
The interests of other stakeholders are therefore still relevant to the calculus 
and are included in the analysis that follows. 
B.  The Quality Calculus 
Turning to that calculus, as a preliminary matter, it is important to be 
precise about the relevant meaning of quality.  As described in Part II, 
quality is transcendent in nature—a matter of goodness or excellence—and 
necessarily a function of objective and subjective standards.  When 
speaking of the quality of patents, then, the meaning used here is the one 
that refers to “degree[s] of excellence,”124 where what constitutes patent 
excellence depends on the views of stakeholders.  In assessing a patent’s 
quality, or excellence, each stakeholder necessarily emphasizes certain 
attributes of the patent.  These attributes—stated in management theory 
terms—are a patent’s quality dimensions. 
As with a product’s quality, a patent’s quality can be understood in terms 
of a three-step process:  first, identify the relevant stakeholders and their 
shared and unique needs and preferences; second, identify the quality 
dimensions that emerge from the stakeholder analysis; finally, measure a 
patent’s merit with respect to each dimension and consolidate those partial 
scores into a final judgment on quality.  Ultimately, a particular patent’s 
 
 119. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 18 (1829) (“[T]he main object [of the patent 
statute] was ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts;’ . . . .”). 
 120. Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1858). 
 121. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). 
 122. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944). 
 123. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 
(2002) (explaining that the patent laws attempt to maintain a balance between the interests of 
inventors and the public); Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State:  Rethinking the 
Patent Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1355 (2004) 
(explaining that under a utilitarian view, the patent system ideally attempts to balance all 
affected interests). 
 124. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1858 (Philip Babcock Gove 
ed., 1993). 
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quality can be described as falling somewhere along a spectrum from lower 
to higher quality.  A simple formula that captures this calculation is: 
TQ = D1 + D2 . . . . 
where TQ is a patent’s total quality score, D1 is a score reflecting the 
patent’s performance along dimension 1, D2 is a score reflecting the 
patent’s performance along dimension 2, and so forth. 
A shortcoming of this formula is that it does not take into account each 
dimension’s relative importance.  To represent the relative importance of 
each quality dimension, a multiplier can be added to the formula as follows: 
TQ = (M1)(D1) + (M2)(D2) . . . . 
where M1 is a multiplier reflecting the relative importance of dimension 1, 
M2 is a multiplier reflecting the relative importance of dimension 2, and so 
forth. 
There are several aspects of this formula that merit further description.  
The first is the identity of each dimension.  As with product dimensions, 
patent dimensions can be better or worse proxies for patent quality; the 
measurements of those dimensions reflect patent quality only to the extent 
that the dimensions are good proxies for quality.  If they are bad proxies, 
their measurements are useless.  The identities of the quality dimensions are 
therefore critical to the accuracy of any judgment on patent quality. 
The second variable is the patent’s performance along each dimension 
and its description.  Performance can be qualitatively evaluated, but 
qualitative assessments cannot easily be compared or consolidated into a 
final judgment on quality.  The functionality of such assessments will 
improve, however, if they are converted into numerical scores.  Of course, 
the construction of a numerical score is itself subjective.  Scores can be 
limited to whole numbers, or they can be presented as fractions or 
percentages.  Scores that are excessively fragmentized are not very 
practical; scores that are insufficiently fragmentized are not very 
informative. 
The third variable is the multiplier for each dimension.  The multiplier 
reflects the dimension’s relative weight in the eyes of stakeholders, and 
depending on the size of the multiplier, it can have a large influence on the 
total quality score.125  But stakeholders will not necessarily agree on the 
 
 125. Consider the following hypothetical.  In the baseline scenario (a), assume that the 
multiplier of one dimension is twice the multiplier of the second.  If the patent performs at 
50 percent along both dimensions, the total quality score is 1.50 out of a total possible score 
of 3.00: 
(a) TQ = (1)(0.50) + (2)(0.50) = 1.50 
But if the patent performs at 80 percent along only one dimension at a time, the total quality 
score increases to 2.10 in (b), where the patent performs better on the more important 
dimension.  By comparison, in (c), it increases to only 1.80 where the patent performs better 
on the less important dimension. 
(b) TQ = (1)(0.50) + (2)(0.80) = 2.10 
(c) TQ = (1)(0.80) + (2)(0.50) = 1.80 
In sum, the total quality score increases by 40 percent when the more important dimension is 
favored but only 20 percent when the less important dimension is favored.  Increasing the 
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size of the multiplier to assign to a particular quality dimension.  One 
stakeholder might view a dimension as critically important; another might 
view the same dimension as trivial or even inapplicable.  In order to assign 
a multiplier to a particular quality dimension, then, it is necessary to 
consolidate stakeholder views on the importance of that dimension.  Thus, 
the multiplier is actually the aggregate of individual stakeholder multipliers, 
as follows: 
M1 = MA + MB . . . . 
where M1 is the aggregate multiplier applied to dimension 1, MA is a 
multiplier reflecting the relative importance of dimension 1 to stakeholder 
A, MB is a multiplier reflecting the relative importance of dimension 1 to 
stakeholder B, and so forth. 
It is possible that stakeholders’ views of dimension 1 will conflict, 
however, further complicating the calculation of M1.  One stakeholder 
might assign a positive multiplier to dimension 1, indicating its preference 
for the dimension, while a different stakeholder might disfavor the 
dimension and assign it a negative multiplier.  In cases of conflict, it is 
necessary to decide whose views are controlling.  As explained in Part 
III.A, given the prominent social identity and purpose of patents, the 
stakeholder whose views will usually be the most important in the context 
of patent quality is the public. 
The fourth variable is the relationship between the quality dimensions.  
Some dimensions may function independently of one another so that 
performance along one dimension is unrelated to performance along 
another dimension.  Other dimensions, however, may oppose each other so 
that performance along one dimension may be achieved only at the expense 
of another.  Conversely, performance along one dimension may reinforce 
the same performance along another dimension:  success begets success, 
and failure begets failure.  Depending on the relationships that exist 
between dimensions, they also can influence the total quality score.126 
Understanding these four variables is not only critical to assessing the 
quality of individual patents; it is also critical to setting a policy agenda that 
 
multiplier of one of the dimensions to ten times that of the second widens this gap by a factor 
of ten. 
 126. Consider the following hypothetical.  In the baseline scenario (a), performance along 
each dimension is independent.  Assume that the patent performs at 60 percent and 40 
percent along dimensions D1 and D2, respectively, and that the dimensions are equal in 
importance (allowing removal of the multiplier from the equation).  The total quality score is 
1.00 out of a possible score of 2.00. 
(a) TQ = (0.60) + (0.40) = 1.00 
Now assume in (b) that the better-than-average performance of the first dimension improves 
the performance of the second to 0.60.  In that case, the total quality score increases 20 
percent to 1.20. 
(b) TQ = (0.60) + (0.60) = 1.20 
But if the better-than-average performance of the first dimension decreases performance of 
the second to 0.20, as in (c), then the total quality score decreases 20 percent to 0.80. 
(c) TQ = (0.60) + (0.20) = 0.80 
The effect of these relationships on the total quality score will be magnified if multipliers are 
introduced into the equation. 
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will improve the quality of the universe of patents.  As in business, in 
policymaking, it is simply not realistic, given scarce resources and other 
practical impediments, to attempt to maximize patent quality along every 
quality dimension.  Even if that were possible, the marginal benefits of 
setting the bar so high would likely never be worth the costs.  The more 
reasonable policy objective, rather, is to strive to maximize patent quality 
along those dimensions—the selected quality niches—that will achieve the 
largest gains at the least cost. 
IV.  STAKEHOLDERS IN PATENT QUALITY 
While application of the formula described in the preceding section 
eventually will require description of all of its variables, the next two Parts 
focus on the most important of these variables:  the relevant quality 
dimensions.  An analysis of the formula’s other variables would require far 
more space than this format allows.  In any event, the other variables 
necessarily depend on the identities of the quality dimensions, and so it is 
appropriate that the analysis begin with them. 
That analysis essentially tracks the first two steps of management 
theorists’ three-step approach for understanding quality in a business 
context.  This Part performs the first step of describing stakeholder 
interests.  Specifically, it describes the basic needs and preferences of four 
major stakeholders in patent quality:  the PTO, the courts, patentees, and the 
public. 
Of course, any categorization of stakeholders is subjective, and some 
inevitably will disagree with the boundaries drawn here.  For example, 
others might subtract categories from or add categories to this list, or they 
might describe these same categories with more or less granularity.  In the 
end, however, lines must be drawn.  The lines drawn here are based on my 
judgment that each of the identified group’s interests in patent quality is 
both sufficiently important to merit description and sufficiently unique to 
merit its own category.  The assumption is that the basic quality needs and 
preferences of each stakeholder are a direct function of these interests. 
A.  The PTO 
The PTO is responsible for, among other things, examining patent 
applications and issuing patents that comply with the conditions of 
patentability.127  The agency is therefore deeply interested in 
“manufacturing” patents consistent with its responsibilities.  This is not 
only a matter of institutional integrity; it is also a matter of good public 
relations.  The PTO has long been accused of doing a poor job of examining 
patents,128 but the frequency and urgency of those complaints have 
intensified in recent years.129 
 
 127. 35 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 128. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra notes 1, 3–8 and accompanying text. 
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In addition, the PTO is interested in reducing its workload with respect to 
both patent applications and issued patents.  It is frequently reported that the 
PTO is understaffed, overworked, and cannot keep pace with the demand 
for its services.  The agency’s performance statistics in recent years seem to 
bear this out.  As an initial matter, the number of applications for patents 
has skyrocketed, reaching over 565,000 new applications in fiscal year 
2012—more than three times the number filed twenty years earlier.130  The 
increased filing activity, in turn, has created a significant backlog of 
pending applications.  The PTO has made notable progress in reducing the 
number of pending applications by, among other things, expanding its 
examining corps.131  Nevertheless, the backlog of applications that have not 
reached final disposition remains high at over 1.15 million by the end of 
fiscal year 2012.132  The average length of pendency of a patent application 
to final disposition (defined as the application’s issuance as a patent or 
abandonment by the applicant) also has increased over time.133 
An applicant can appeal an examiner’s final rejection of a patent 
application to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the agency’s 
quasi-judicial body.134  The number of ex parte appeals pending before the 
PTAB has grown exponentially to 26,570 at the end of fiscal year 2012, 
more than eight times the number pending only ten years earlier.135  In 
 
 130. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 
FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 176 tbl.2. 
 131. The PTO currently employs almost 8,000 patent examiners (excluding design patent 
examiners). Data Visualization Center:  February 2014 Patents Data, at a Glance, 
USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014).  This represents an increase of over 2,000 examiners in a little over six years. See 
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2007, at 13 (identifying 5,477 patent examiners at the end of fiscal year 2007). 
 132. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 130, at 177 tbl.3.  Not only does the 
PTO face an enormous backlog of original patent applications, but it also faces a large 
backlog of requests for continued examination (RCE).  An RCE is a request to continue the 
examination of a patent application after prosecution of the application has closed, as when 
an examiner issues a final rejection. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2013) (describing RCE 
practice before the PTO).  In early 2014, over 80,000 RCE applications were awaiting initial 
action. See Data Visualization Center:  February 2014 Patents Data, at a Glance, supra 
note 131. 
 133. The average pendency in fiscal year 2012 was 32.4 months. U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 130, at 177 tbl.4.  Ten years earlier, the average total 
pendency was twenty-four months. Id. at 16 fig.5.  In early 2014, however, the PTO was 
reporting an average pendency of 28.1 months. Data Visualization Center:  February 2014 
Patents Data, at a Glance, supra note 131. 
 134. See 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) (2012).  The PTAB is formerly known as the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI). See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 § 3(J)(1) (2011) (providing that the BPAI shall hereafter be known as 
the PTAB). 
 135. Compare Fiscal Year 2002, Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences, Receipts and 
Dispositions by Groups, Ex Parte Appeals, USPTO.GOV, http://patents.uspto.gov/ip/boards/
bpai/stats/receipts/fy2002.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (identifying 3,090 ex parte appeals 
pending at the end of FY 2002), with Fiscal Year 2012, Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 
Receipts and Dispositions by Technology Centers, Ex Parte Appeals, USPTO.GOV, 
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/stats/receipts/fy2012_sep_e.pdf (last visited Apr. 26, 
2014).  The PTO is hiring more administrative judges to hear these cases. See Gene Quinn, 9 
New Administrative Patent Judges Sworn in at the USPTO, IP WATCHDOG (Mar. 2, 2012), 
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addition to hearing appeals of rejected applications, the PTAB also presides 
over third-party challenges to the validity of issued patents and patentee 
requests to reaffirm the validity of their issued patents.136  Historically, 
these mechanisms have consisted of appeals of ex parte and inter partes 
reexamination decisions, where reexamination is a process through which 
anyone may request reopening examination of an issued patent on grounds 
that there exists a “substantial new question of patentability.”137  Recently, 
the America Invents Act expanded the PTAB’s responsibilities to include 
presiding over still more kinds of proceedings.138 
In addition to reexamining patents, the PTO is responsible for correcting 
and modifying them.  Among other things, it entertains requests to “reissue” 
already-issued patents in circumstances where the patent’s claims are too 
narrow or broad.139  The number of reissue applications filed in 2012 was 
over 1,200, more than double the number filed twenty years earlier.140  The 
average pendency of reissue applications has also grown significantly in 
recent years.141 
In sum, the PTO’s most pressing quality concerns include issuing patents 
that are consistent with its institutional responsibilities and that will be a 
minimal burden to it following issuance. 
B.  The Courts 
Importantly, the PTO shares responsibility for adjudicating patent 
challenges with the federal courts.142  Because the agency’s rulings are 
 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/02/9-new-administrative-patent-judges-sworn-in-at-
the-uspto/id=22548/ (noting that nineteen new judges had been sworn in as of March 2012).  
Nevertheless, some remain skeptical that hiring more judges will sufficiently address the 
problem. See Dennis Crouch, BPAI Appeals Cyclic Decision Making PATENTLYJOBS (Feb. 
15, 2012), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/02/bpai-appeal-decisionmaking.html. 
 136. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (providing that the PTAB shall preside over appeals of ex parte 
reexamination decisions and conduct inter partes review and post-grant review proceedings). 
 137. Id. § 304 (ex parte reexamination); id. § 312(a) (Supp. IV 2010) (repealed by Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act § 6(a), Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)) (inter partes 
reexamination).  Although the PTO is no longer accepting requests to institute inter partes 
reexamination proceedings, the PTAB must still dispose of those appealed cases that remain 
pending. 
 138. These are post-grant review proceedings, id. §§ 321–329, inter partes review 
proceedings, id. §§ 311–319, and transitional post-grant review proceedings of business 
method patents, Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18. 
 139. See 35 U.S.C. § 251. 
 140. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 130, at 176 tbl.2. 
 141. Dennis Crouch, Reissue Patent Pendency, PATENTLYO (Jan. 23, 2011), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/01/reissue-patent-pendency.html (finding that reissue 
application pendency had grown from a little over two years in 1990 to almost five years by 
2010). 
 142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any 
civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents[ and] plant variety 
protection . . . .”).  More precisely, one may challenge the validity of a patent concurrently in 
an administrative proceeding before the PTO and a judicial proceeding before a federal 
court. See 35 U.S.C. § 315 (establishing rules for the administration of an inter partes review 
proceeding and concurrently pending civil action involving the same patent); id. § 325 
(establishing rules for the administration of a post-grant review proceeding and concurrently 
pending civil action involving the same patent); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.565, 1.985 (2013) (requiring 
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appealable to federal court, however, the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter on 
patent disputes.143  Given its important and unique relationship to the patent 
system, the judiciary is designated here as a distinct stakeholder, although 
there is admittedly overlap of some of those interests with the interests of 
the PTO and the public. 
There is evidence that, like the PTO, the judiciary faces a patent-related 
workload that is growing.  In the fifteen-year period between 1997 and 
2011, the number of patent suits filed in the federal courts almost doubled, 
rising from 2,112 to 4,015.144  As a result of new joinder rules that limit the 
ability of patent owners to join defendants, the number is growing ever 
faster.145  Moreover, while the total number of lawsuits also increased 
during this same time period, patent cases represent a steadily increasing 
percentage of that total number.  In 1997, patent cases represented a little 
less than 0.8 percent of all lawsuits; in 2011, they represented 1.4 
percent.146 
Patent cases also represent a steadily increasing number of federal cases 
pending for three or more years.  That number more than doubled in the 
fifteen-year period from 1997 to 2011, rising from 238 to 480.147  Notably, 
the rate of long-pending patent cases kept rising despite significant 
fluctuations in the overall number of long-pending cases during that period.  
In particular, the rate of long-pending patent cases rose even during the 
 
notification to the PTO of any concurrent litigation proceedings involving a patent at issue in 
a reexamination proceeding). 
 143. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(a), 145 (providing that a party dissatisfied with the PTAB’s 
decision rejecting any patent claims in an original examination may appeal to the Federal 
Circuit or pursue a civil action against the PTO director in the Eastern District of Virginia); 
id. § 141(b)–(c) (providing that a party dissatisfied with the PTAB’s decision in a 
reexamination, inter partes review, or post-grant review proceeding must appeal to the 
Federal Circuit). 
 144. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2011 tbl.C-2A (2011) (providing 
statistics for the years 2007 to 2011); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2006 tbl.C-2A 
(2006) (providing statistics for the years 2002 to 2006); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. 
COURTS 2001 tbl.C-2A (2001) (providing statistics for the years 1997 to 2001). 
 145. See New Patent Cases Filed, PATSTATS.ORG, http://patstats.org/Patstats3.html (last 
updated Jan. 15, 2014) (identifying the number of patent cases filed in calendar year 2012 as 
5,778, and noting that the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act’s new constraints on joinder 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 299(a)) are responsible for some but not all of the increase). 
 146. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 1997 tbl.C-2A (1997) (showing 
that patent suits comprised 2,112 of 272,027 total civil cases commenced in 1997), with 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2011, supra note 144, tbl.C-2A (showing that patent 
suits comprised 4,015 of 289,252 total civil cases commenced in 2011). 
 147. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2011, supra note 144, tbl.C-12 
(providing statistics for the year 2011); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2010 tbl.S-
11 (2010) (providing statistics for the years 2009 to 2010); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. 
COURTS 2008 tbl.S-11 (2008) (providing statistics for the years 2007 to 2008); JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2006 tbl.S-11 (2006) (providing statistics for the years 2005 to 
2006); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2004 tbl.S-11 (2004) (providing statistics for 
the years 2003 to 2004); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 2002 tbl.S-11 (2002) 
(providing statistics for the years 2001 to 2002); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS 
2000 tbl.S-11 (2000) (providing statistics for the years 1999 to 2000); JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF 
THE U.S. COURTS 1998 tbl.S-11 (1998) (providing statistics for the years 1997 to 1998). 
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years 1999, 2006, 2007, and 2008, when the overall number of long-
pending cases was at its lowest.148 
These trends are reason for judicial concern given that patent suits are 
considered to be among the most complex types of civil cases.149  Patent 
suits often involve complicated technologies, some of which require expert 
assistance to explain to judges and juries.150  They also require fluency in 
an elaborate web of international and domestic laws and regulations.151  
The sheer number of these legal requirements and procedures has increased 
exponentially over time, making the work of understanding and applying 
them even more difficult.152 
Moreover, patent trials are typically preceded by minitrials called 
Markman hearings during which the courts interpret, or construe, the claims 
at issue.153  The process of claim construction can be time-consuming, often 
requiring courts to consult many sources other than the patent document to 
determine claim meaning.154  And the process can be further complicated 
 
 148. See supra note 147 (identifying statistical sources). 
 149. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from 
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (“Patent 
litigation has been called the sport of kings; it is complex, uncertain, and expensive.”); 
Jennifer K. Bush et al., Six Patent Law Puzzlers, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 2 (2004) (“To 
call patent law complex is to call the sky blue or the ocean vast and deep.  Patent law’s 
complexity has long been acknowledged, and notwithstanding reform proposals aimed at 
simplification, it is likely to remain complex.”); Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear 
Complex Patent Cases?, 2004 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 4, 29 (“Patent litigation involves some 
of the most complex legal theories and underlying factual issues of any type of litigation 
today.”). 
 150. Unlike PTAB judges, federal court judges are not required to have any technical 
expertise to hear patent cases. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (requiring administrative 
patent judges to be “persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability”), with Peter 
Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 10 & nn.30–32 (2010) (explaining 
that the number of scientifically trained district court judges is likely very low).  Notably, 
although the judges of the Federal Circuit are often assumed to have technical training, only 
a handful of them hold scientific degrees. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard 
of Patent Law:  Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 2010 
(2013). 
 151. These include the Patent Act codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376, federal patent 
regulations codified at 37 C.F.R. §§ 1–501.9, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 
28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231, available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/pdf/
pct.pdf, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April, 
15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips.pdf. 
 152. One proxy for this expansion is the Manual of Patent Examination and Procedure 
(MPEP), which sets forth patent laws and rules and describes their interpretation and 
application for patent examiners.  The original fifth edition of the MPEP, which was 
published in 1983, consisted of twenty-two chapters and was 595 pages long (excluding 
appendices). MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE (5th ed. 1983), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/old/mpep_E5R0.htm.  The most recent eighth 
edition consists of twenty-seven chapters and is almost 2,300 pages long (excluding 
appendices). See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, supra note 103. 
 153. These hearings are named after the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc. that claim construction is a matter of law for the courts alone to 
decide. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
 154. Potential sources of claim meaning include dictionaries, reference materials, a 
patent’s prosecution history, reports of court-appointed technical advisors or special masters, 
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where the patent at issue concerns an obscure or rapidly developing 
technical field or where the claims at issue use idiosyncratic terms.155  
Perhaps reflecting each of these factors, patent cases have been described 
by one Federal Circuit judge as “among the longest, most time-consuming 
types of civil actions.”156 
Of course, patent lawsuits can drag out for reasons having more to do 
with the business objectives or combative nature of the litigants than with 
the quality of the patents at issue.  Malpractice suits may therefore be a 
more reliable reflection of patent quality issues than patent lawsuits.  
Although public data on prosecution-based malpractice claims is sparse, 
there is some evidence that malpractice suits based on substantive drafting 
errors—for example, incorrect or incomplete descriptions of inventions—
are on the rise.157 
For these reasons, the judiciary’s major quality interests include both 
reducing the number of patent-related disputes it is called upon to resolve 
and increasing the efficiency of its resolution of those disputes. 
C.  Patentees 
Considering patent quality from the perspective of patentees shifts the 
inquiry from design and manufacturing concerns to the needs and 
preferences of users.  The original owner of every patent is the inventor of 
what is described in the patent.158  Patent rights are alienable, however, and 
inventors often assign them to other persons and entities.159  Some 
 
and fact and expert witness testimonies regarding, inter alia, the technology at issue and 
patent office procedure. See Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Claim Construction:  A Modern 
Synthesis and Structured Framework, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 711, 800–06 (2010). 
 155. Guidelines for Patent Claim Construction:  Post-Philips—The Basics of a Markman 
Hearing, 16 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 13, 18, 26 (2006).  However, courts are increasingly 
implementing measures intended to reduce the complexity of the claim construction process. 
See, e.g., N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 4-1(b), 4-3(c) (requiring the parties to identify the ten 
“most significant” terms to be construed by the court); N.D. ILL. LPR 4.1(b) (providing a 
default rule limiting the number of terms to be construed to ten).  Nevertheless, a Markman 
hearing can easily last a week or longer. See, e.g., Rick McDermott, Annual Intellectual 
Property Law Review Banquet Speech:  Lessons Learned from Fifteen Years in the Trenches 
of Patent Litigation, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 471, 473 (2010) (describing a patent 
litigator’s experience with Markman hearings). 
 156. Ohio Willow Wood Co. v. Thermo-Ply, Inc., 629 F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(Moore, J., concurring).  The burden of patent litigation on the courts has long been of 
interest to Judge Moore. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases:  
Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 933 (2001) (finding that 
although patent cases represented only 0.57 percent of the annual civil caseload in district 
courts between 1983 and 1999, they represented 9.4 percent of all civil cases requiring 
twenty or more days of trial). 
 157. See Christi J. Guerrini, The Decline of the Patent Registration Exam, 91 NEB. L. 
REV. 325, 372 nn.263–66 (2012). 
 158. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. EDO Corp., 990 F.2d 1237, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating 
that the ownership of a patent initially vests in the named inventors of the invention 
described in the patent); see also Isr. Bio-Engineering Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 
1256, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“It is a bedrock tenet of patent law that ‘an invention 
presumptively belongs to its creator.’” (quoting Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 
F.3d 403, 406 (Fed. Cir. 1996))). 
 159. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012) (providing that patents and applications can be assigned). 
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assignees will pay dearly for those rights if they wish to practice the 
patented invention or control the rights of others to do so. 
While patents can be valuable to their owners because the inventions they 
protect are commercially successful, they also can have value as business 
assets independent of their underlying inventions.  Because the economic 
value of a creation depends in part on the legal rights that attach to it, every 
patent has value by virtue of the rights of exclusion that its owner enjoys.160  
Patentees can monetize these rights by, among other things, constructing 
large portfolios that they can then license or use strategically for offensive 
or defensive purposes.161  Indeed, in some industries, competition within 
the patent space is fierce, with each participant stockpiling patents in what 
has been described as an escalating “intellectual-property arms race.”162  
Patentees also can derive value from their patents by using them as 
deterrents to competitors and signals to consumers.163 
But an invalid patent is not enforceable.  Although invalid patents can be 
used as a means to limit competition, charge supranormal prices, obtain 
licensing fees, and attract capital, one’s ability to engage in those activities 
will last only so long as the patents go unchallenged.  Once challenged, an 
invalid patent may have negative value if unsuccessfully defended.164  All 
things being equal, then, patentees prefer that their patents be enforceable. 
 
 160. See Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed To Promote?:  Defining “Progress” 
in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the 
Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 789 (2001).  Admittedly, in some cases, that value 
may be negligible. 
 161. See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace:  The Complex Patent 
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 300, 326–32 
(2010) (describing the various ways in which firms can use patents offensively and 
defensively). 
 162. Sam Gustin, Patent Progress:  What Apple and HTC’s Landmark Pact Means for the 
Patent Wars, TIME (Nov. 12, 2012), http://business.time.com/2012/11/12/patent-perestroika-
what-apple-and-htcs-landmark-pact-means-for-the-patent-wars/; see also The Arms Race:  
Companies Are Preparing for the Intellectual-Property Battle, ECONOMIST (SPECIAL 
REPORT), Oct. 22, 2005, at 6, 8 (interviewing industry insiders who describe how companies 
today are building up patent portfolios (“nukes pointing at each other”), demanding royalties, 
and enforcing patent rights in court because, as explained by one German software 
executive, “These are the rules of the game!”).  Perhaps exemplifying this trend, in 2011, 
Apple and Google for the first time spent more on patent purchases and intellectual property 
litigation than they did on research and development. See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The 
Patent, Used As a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at A1. 
 163. Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 655–58 (2002) (explaining the 
communication function of patents as a means of credibly publicizing information to the 
marketplace). 
 164. In 2011, the cost of patent litigation was estimated to be $5 million for a case worth 
more than $25 million. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 2011, at 35 (2011).  These costs are between two and three times higher than those 
for other kinds of intellectual property litigation. See id. at 35–36 (reporting the median 
estimated cost of trade secret misappropriation, trademark, and copyright cases with more 
than $25 million at risk as, respectively, $2.5 million, $1.5 million, and $1.375 million); see 
also THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE 
PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE:  A CASE-BASED NATIONAL SURVEY OF 
COUNSEL IN CLOSED FEDERAL CIVIL CASES 38–39 (1997) (finding, based on a nationwide 
survey of attorneys, that patent cases are among those civil cases having the highest 
discovery expenses). 
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Patentees also prefer that the rights of exclusion that attach to their 
patents be broad.  Broad rights can be achieved in two ways. First, broad 
rights attach to “flexible” claims that can be interpreted in various ways to 
fit the circumstances.165  In order for a claim to achieve maximum coverage 
of infringing activity, it must anticipate the technological changes that will 
occur during the time lag between the issuance of a patent and its 
interpretation in an adversarial proceeding.166  This is accomplished by 
writing claims in vague terms that can bend in response to the patentee’s 
changing circumstances.167 
But broad rights can also attach to unambiguous claims when they are 
drafted such that their boundaries push up against, and arguably even 
exceed, what was actually invented.168  Broadly drafted claims expand the 
scope of conduct that is deemed infringing, while narrowly drafted claims 
limit that scope and therefore the universe of potential infringers.169 
In sum, patentees’ most pressing quality interests are in patents that 
represent maximum value to them, where a patent’s value will usually be a 
function of the unique business circumstances of its owner and the nature of 
both the invention that the patent describes and the patent’s description of 
that invention. 
D.  The Public 
As explained in Part III, the primary goal of the patent system is a 
utilitarian one of promoting invention for the benefit of the public.170  
Excluding patentees from this population, for any given patent, the public 
includes individuals who are metaphorically so far away from the patent 
that they are unlikely to ever be accused of infringing it, as well as 
competitors who are metaphorically close to the patent and either seek to 
practice the patented invention or avoid practicing (and being accused of 
infringing) it.  The quality interests of these individuals are aligned, 
although in specific cases they will likely vary in intensity depending on 
one’s distance from a particular patent. 
Ideally, each patent application would be evaluated to determine whether 
granting the applicant an exclusive right to limit access to potentially 
important innovations is worth it from a welfare perspective.171  That 
 
 165. Wagner, supra note 1, at 2148–51. 
 166. See id. 
 167. See id. at 2149.  Patentees’ preference for vague claims that introduce uncertainty 
about claim scope and meaning is also discussed in R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering 
Estoppel:  Patent Administration and the Failure of Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 216 
(2002). 
 168. Wagner, supra note 167, at 216. 
 169. See Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Patent Incentives 8–13 (Dec. 
20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2147491 
(explaining the trade-off between narrow and broad claims for validity and infringement 
analyses). 
 170. See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text. 
 171. See Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 741 
(2012). 
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evaluation, however, would be prohibitively expensive.172  In its place, 
Congress has codified the standards of patentability to distinguish those 
applications that should issue as patents from those that should be rejected 
in a manner that is consistent with the goals of the patent system.173 
If the standards of patentability are properly calibrated to minimize costs 
and maximize benefits, then the public strongly prefers patents that satisfy 
those conditions.  This assumes, however, that the standards themselves are 
correctly applied.  Congress establishes the standards of patentability and 
the PTO and courts interpret and apply them to particular cases, in the 
process providing further definition to the standards.  Even if the standards 
are properly calibrated, if they are incorrectly applied, some issued patents 
will presumably reflect an imbalance of costs and benefits. 
That the conditions of patentability are properly calibrated and applied is 
important to the public for the additional reason that infringement of a 
patent is a strict liability offense.174  This means that one may be liable for 
infringing a patent regardless of intent to infringe and regardless even of 
knowledge of the patent.175  The public, which consists of potential 
infringers, must therefore avoid practicing the inventions protected by 
patents or else risk a charge of infringement.  With respect to paradigmatic 
patented items like mechanical widgets, most people are metaphorically so 
far away from the invention that their legal duties with respect to it are 
irrelevant.176  But patent law has expanded over the decades to include 
nonparadigmatic items, such as business methods and sports moves.177  
Given the generalized nature of many of these items, the class of persons 
likely to infringe includes a much larger subset of the population.178  With 
respect especially to patents on nonparadigmatic items, it is important to the 
public that they are worth their compliance costs.179 
Moreover, it is important that all patents be understandable to interested 
persons so that they may decide whether or not to comply, and when they 
choose to comply, that they know how to do so.  It is also generally easier 
to justify the costs of complying with patents that describe socially useful 
inventions.180  Although some patents describe such inventions, there is no 
 
 172. See id. 
 173. See id. at 741–42. 
 174. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 175. See, e.g., Blair v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 291 F. Supp. 664, 670 (D.D.C. 1968) 
(“[A]n infringement may be entirely inadvertent and unintentional and without knowledge of 
the patent.”). 
 176. Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 491 
(2004). 
 177. See id. at 507, 536, 541. 
 178. See id. at 487–88. 
 179. See id. at 468 (explaining that nonowners, or “observers,” must “cognize and 
mentally process at least enough information to determine where the boundaries of 
protection lie so as to fulfill their legal duties of avoiding infringement”). 
 180. See Michael Risch, A Surprisingly Useful Requirement, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 57, 
64 (2011) (“An invention’s usefulness indicates social welfare; when an invention is useless, 
society reaps no benefit.”). 
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requirement that they do so.181  Consequently, many inventors file patent 
applications before they can tell whether their inventions will satisfy any 
public need.  This is good if the aim of the patent system is to encourage the 
prompt dissemination of ideas, but it is bad from the perspective of the 
public to the extent that it increases the number of patents with which the 
public must comply without providing offsetting welfare benefits. 
The public also includes taxpayers who are interested in the efficient 
administration of the patent system.  That is because the patent system 
relies in part on public funds for its operation and enforcement.  The PTO is 
user-fee funded;182 its efficient operation is therefore of primary interest to 
patentees.  The judicial system, however, is largely funded by the public.183  
The public therefore shares the concerns of the judiciary described in the 
preceding subsection. 
For the public, however, these concerns are tempered by the potential 
social benefit of patent challenges.  A ruling that a patent is invalid 
enhances social welfare because the ruling effectively returns information 
to the public domain that never should have been removed from it.184  If 
patent challenges are more likely to involve valuable inventions, as some 
have suggested,185 their social benefit might be substantial.  It is one thing 
to improperly exclude information from the public domain that everyone 
agrees is trivial or worthless.  It is another to improperly exclude 
information that others would benefit from using. 
Of course, not every patent challenge concludes with an invalidity 
ruling.186  Moreover, some patents are invalidated based on obscure 
references that never would have been located but for the efforts of adverse 
 
 181. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 
78 (2005). 
 182. Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives:  Pressure To Expand 
Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 407 & n.107 (2011) (stating that “[t]he PTO is 
a self-funded agency that obtains its entire budget through user fees” and “the PTO[’s] 
budget is set to the amount of [its] projected revenue”). 
 183. Julia S. Gibbons, How the Judiciary Gets Its Funding, FED. LAW., Oct. 2009, at 30 
(explaining the process by which the federal judiciary applies to Congress for its funding). 
 184. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty:  Litigation-Stage Rewards for 
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 688 (2004) (“A court judgment that a 
patent claim is invalid is a public good.”). 
 185. To date, there are no empirical studies investigating a connection between valuable 
inventions and the litigation rates of patents covering such inventions, but an understanding 
that such a link exists seems reasonable. See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 149, at 21 
(“[V]aluable inventions are more likely to be litigated . . . .”); Stephen T. Schreiner & 
Patrick A. Doody, Patent Continuation Applications:  How the PTO’s Proposed New Rules 
Undermine an Important Part of the U.S. Patent System with Hundreds of Years of History, 
88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 556, 561 n.21 (2006) (“[I]t is reasonable to expect that 
patents on significant inventions are more likely to be litigated.”).  Valuable inventions are to 
be contrasted with valuable patents, whose litigation rates have been empirically studied. See 
generally John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004). 
 186. Although the number of patents that are invalidated during litigation is surprisingly 
high, approximately half of claims are still affirmed as valid when challenged in court. See 
supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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parties.187  It is difficult to say that invalidating an otherwise valid patent on 
the basis of a paper tucked away in a foreign library does the public a 
service that justifies its costs.  In the end, it is uncertain whether patent 
challenges do more social harm than good and so are worth the public funds 
that subsidize some of them.  Nevertheless, a consideration of these 
challenges’ costs and benefits is at least useful for underscoring the 
significance to the public of their efficient and proper resolution. 
In general, the public is powerfully interested in maintaining a balanced 
patent system that protects patented inventions—especially those that are 
socially useful—where doing so justifies the costs of compliance and 
monopoly and where affected bystanders can know what constitutes 
compliant conduct.  Further, the public is interested in the efficient 
administration of the judicial system, especially with respect to both 
invalidating patents that never should have issued and upholding patents 
that merit protection. 
V.  DIMENSIONS OF PATENT QUALITY 
The foregoing analysis of stakeholder preferences reveals certain features 
or dimensions related to patents that are relevant to the question of patent 
quality’s meaning.  Described in detail below, they are:  (1) a patent’s 
probable validity; (2) clarity of the patent; (3) faithfulness of the patent to 
the scope of the underlying invention; (4) social utility of the invention; and 
(5) commercial success of the invention. 
The dimensions of probable validity, clarity, and faithfulness focus on 
the patent document, while the dimensions of social utility and commercial 
success focus on the invention described in the patent. In other words, 
patent quality is a function of both the patent as an informational document 
and legal instrument and its underlying invention as a thing that operates in 
the real world.  Consistent with the discussion in Part III.A, both patent-
based and invention-based dimensions are included in an understanding of 
patent quality as a result of the difficulty of disentangling the quality of an 
invention from the quality of a patent that is intended to capture the 
invention. 
In describing each dimension, this Part summarizes each stakeholder’s 
preference (or not) for that dimension.  Beyond the earlier observation that 
the public interest generally should take precedence in cases of conflict,188 
however, it makes no attempt to weigh or balance competing interests.  This 
Part also explains the relationships between specific dimensions where 
doing so is necessary to distinguish them.  But it does not attempt to work 
out the many ways in which the dimensions positively and negatively 
reinforce one another.  Again, the objective is to identify the dimensions on 
which these other variables depend, and in so doing, to lay the groundwork 
for further analysis. 
 
 187. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 899–900 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that a single copy of 
a thesis indexed in one German library constituted invalidating prior art). 
 188. See supra Part III.A. 
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A.  Probable Validity 
The first quality dimension is legal validity, or a patent’s conformance 
with the standards of patentability.  In theory, valid patent claims embody 
the patent system’s compromise between the benefits of increased 
innovation and its disclosure and the costs of monopoly and compliance.  
As explained by Federal Circuit Judge Pauline Newman, “The question of 
patent quality requires a threshold focus on the standard by which quality is 
measured, which in turn is determined by the purpose of a system of 
patents. . . .  The quality of a patent is measured by how effectively it fulfils 
that purpose.”189  A patent’s validity is therefore a good proxy for its 
quality where the conditions of patentability correctly distinguish patents 
that fulfill the purpose of the patent system. 
This does not mean, however, that the legal standards are only relevant to 
patent quality where the standards are perfectly calibrated to make that 
distinction.  As an initial matter, perfect calibration likely could never be 
achieved given the myriad influences on the interpretation and application 
of those standards in specific cases.  In any event, it seems clear that, 
whatever the substance of the legal standards, stakeholders associate patents 
that meet those standards with good quality for the reason that they promote 
the efficient conduct of all who encounter them. 
The PTO, for one, associates valid patent claims with good patent quality 
because issuing such claims is consistent with its institutional mission, and 
patentees prefer such claims because exclusionary rights attach to valid 
claims but not invalid ones.  Moreover, the PTO, the courts, and the public 
prefer valid patents for the additional reason that rational persons accused 
of infringing them will not go to the expense of challenging their 
validity.190  Accused infringers are less likely to pursue a challenge that 
they will surely lose than they are to quickly settle the case and spend any 
excess funds on research and development and other socially useful 
activities.191 
Importantly, these behavioral predictions assume that a patent’s validity 
can be observed.  In reality, however, a patent’s validity can never be 
certain.  That is because a claim’s presumption of validity can be 
challenged, and such challenges are in fact frequently successful.192  There 
are a number of rules that contribute to this outcome.  For one, courts 
 
 189. Pauline Newman, Panel Contribution, in Adams, supra note 4, at 62. 
 190. See supra note 164 (describing the high costs of patent litigation). 
 191. On the other hand, rational owners of invalid claims will not press them in an 
adversarial proceeding but instead will attempt to license the claims at a cost that is lower 
than anticipated litigation expenses. See David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee 
Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L. REV. 335, 370–71 (2012) (describing this 
well-known (and much-maligned) tactic of certain nonpracticing entities).  Rational persons 
accused of infringing an invalid patent claim will accept this deal, albeit unhappily, because 
it makes economic sense to do so. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 181, at 88–89.  In 
addition, there is a public good problem that discourages persons accused of infringing a 
patent claim from challenging it in court:  rivals will benefit from a finding that the claim is 
invalid but will pay nothing to obtain that benefit. See id. at 88–90. 
 192. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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determine validity from the perspective of the person having ordinary skill 
in the art (known as the PHOSITA), and unlike any real person, the 
PHOSITA is endowed with knowledge of all relevant technology, known as 
“prior art” references.193  In practice, the determination of the relevant art in 
which the PHOSITA is deemed to have ordinary skill is relatively fluid and 
therefore subject to manipulation.194  Moreover, the universe of prior art 
can be broadly construed to include publications that are known by only a 
few persons in the world.195  Defendants have every incentive to unearth 
such references and argue for their inclusion in the universe of relevant 
prior art.196  Further, new defendants are not collaterally estopped from 
attacking a patent claim’s validity,197 and because historical information 
about the state of the art is continuously surfacing,198 new defendants may 
be successful in invalidating claims where others had failed. 
As a result of these rules, the validity of patent claims is never truly 
final.199  It is therefore less accurate to refer to a claim as valid or invalid 
than it is to refer to a claim’s probability of being held valid or not if 
challenged.200 
But is it even possible to calculate a particular claim’s probability of 
validity?  Anecdotally, at least some members of the patent community 
assert that they can identify when a patent claim is particularly strong,201 
and scholars routinely assume that the validity of some claims is self-
evident.202  This commentary suggests that at least some claims are being 
 
 193. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1188 (2002). 
 194. See id. at 1189 (“[T]he parameters of the art are subject to fluctuation, and thus so is 
the size and depth of the library of references with which the PHOSITA is presumed to be 
familiar.”). 
 195. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 196. At least some members of the patent bar believe that developing such proof is only a 
matter of time and resources. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 191, at 371 (quoting a plaintiffs’ 
lawyer’s explanation that “[t]he more a patent is litigated, it tends to decrease in value as 
people come up with better prior art or over-analyze the thing”). 
 197. This is the rule of nonmutual issue preclusion announced in Blonder-Tongue 
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971). 
 198. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 46, at 55 (explaining that objective evidence of 
validity issues like obviousness come to light over time). 
 199. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 181, at 75 (asserting that a patent right is not a 
guarantee of a right of exclusion but rather is a legal right to try to exclude). 
 200. Cf. Graf, supra note 9, at 499–500 (noting that some commentators define patent 
quality not in terms of validity but rather in terms of certainty of validity). 
 201. See, e.g., Russ Krajec, Can Patent Quality Be Measured?, ANYTHING UNDER THE 
SUN MADE BY MAN, http://www.krajec.com/blog/can-patent-quality-be-measured (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2014) (stating that most patent prosecutors claim that they know good patent 
quality when they see it and that some are “really good, and some not so good”).  It is fair to 
assume, however, that such assessments are made without regard to invalidating “secret” 
prior art. 
 202. See, e.g., Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 46, at 58 (asserting that a “clearly valid” 
patent does not much benefit from a validity presumption); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 
121 YALE L.J. 470, 514 (2011) (explaining that “obviously” valid and invalid patents are 
usually settled before trial); Note, Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 
840, 856 (1960) (stating the desirability of deterring infringement of “obviously valid” 
patents). 
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identified as probably valid as a matter of course.  Recently, empirical 
studies have sought to identify ways to validate these intuitive 
judgments.203  As more data is gathered and studies are performed, it may 
soon become possible to calculate a patent’s probable validity with some 
degree of accuracy.204 
B.  Clarity 
The second quality dimension is patent clarity.  The correct interpretation 
of patents is a notoriously difficult task given, among other things, the 
inherent impossibility of words to describe things,205 the technical jargon 
and “patent-ese” that infuse patents,206 and the patentee’s lexicographical 
right to invent new words and provide new definitions for existing 
words.207  And the task is made no easier by the lack of a stable analytic 
framework to guide judges in the claim construction process.208  
Consequently, it is not uncommon for a court’s construction of claim terms 
to be reversed when appealed to the Federal Circuit.  One study found that 
38 percent of district court cases appealed between 1996 and 2007 included 
at least one wrongly construed term.209 
Although some of the problems associated with claim construction are 
unavoidable, a patent can do a better or worse job of describing its 
underlying invention.  This avoidable ambiguity makes it difficult for 
readers of a patent to understand the invention and reliably predict whether 
the PTO, the courts, and third parties will take a similar view of the 
meaning of claim terms. 
The patent statute includes a patentability condition known as the 
definiteness requirement that is intended to ensure a minimum level of 
clarity for all patents.210  The definiteness requirement provides that claims 
must “particularly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject matter 
 
 203. One such study, for example, found that certain prosecution events and facial 
features of patents, including the degree of match between a patent’s specification and its 
claims, are strongly correlated with validity rulings. See Mann & Underweiser, supra note 1, 
at 29–30. 
 204. These calculations, however, must necessarily include a discount for those legal 
rules that allow patents to be invalidated for unpredictable reasons, such as the unearthing of 
obscure prior art. See In re Hall, 781 F.2d 897, 898 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 205. See Autogiro Co. of Am. v. United States, 384 F.2d 391, 397 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (stating 
that converting physical inventions to words “allows for unintended idea gaps which cannot 
be satisfactorily filled,” because the invention is new and words do not yet exist to describe 
it). 
 206. Richard P. Beem, The Abraham Lincoln School of Patent Litigation, 19 PRAC. 
LITIGATOR, May 2008, at 59, 62 (“Do patents really need to be translated into plain English?  
. . .  Perhaps no other practice has incurred the wrath of the courts so much as the use of 
complicated technical language, or ‘patentese.’”). 
 207. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 208. Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 46, at 57 (explaining that the interpretive rules 
under which patent claims are analyzed are “constantly in flux”). 
 209. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect?  An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 240 (2008). 
 210. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
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which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”211  A patent 
claim is sufficiently definite so long as it is capable of interpretation, even 
though the conclusion may be one over which reasonable persons 
disagree.212  It is only the “insolubly ambiguous” claim that will be held 
indefinite.213  Applying these rules, claims are invalidated for indefiniteness 
in only the most egregious circumstances, such as where the meaning of a 
term depends entirely on a person’s subjective opinion.214  Because the 
definiteness requirement sets a low bar, the dimension of clarity refers to 
clarity exceeding what is currently required by the definiteness standards of 
patentability. 
Unlike the dimension of validity, the interests of stakeholders are not 
aligned on the dimension of clarity.  While patentees do not prefer patents 
that are particularly explicit,215 the PTO, the courts, and the public associate 
patent clarity with good quality because unambiguous patents are more 
easily construed than ambiguous ones.  Unambiguous patents also promote 
a purpose of the patent system:  to promote the disclosure of innovation.216  
A patent’s disclosure is incomplete and cannot induce further innovation 
where those in the relevant technical fields cannot understand it.  
Ambiguous patents also fail to inform others of their protected boundaries.  
As a result, third parties may invest in working within those boundaries, 
which is unlawful and also potentially wasteful, or decline to invest in 
working near but outside of those boundaries under the mistaken belief that 
the area is protected.217  Further, those who may wish to practice the 
invention are unable to make informed decisions about whether to license 
or purchase it, file a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate it, or 
roll the dice with a lawsuit and infringe it.  And those who wish to avoid 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 359 F.3d 1367, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (interpreting the term “surrender value protected investment credits,” which was not 
defined in the patent or in any industry publication, to be synonymous with “stable value 
protected investment credits,” even though the patent used the different terms in different 
ways that suggested they had different meanings, and ultimately holding the claim 
sufficiently definite (emphasis added)), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Bancorp Servs., 
L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 213. Id.  Where the question of indefiniteness is a close one, it is resolved in favor of 
validity. See id. (citing Exxon Research & Eng’g Co. v. United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1380 
(2001)). 
 214. For instance, the Federal Circuit has invalidated for indefiniteness a claim using the 
term “aesthetically pleasing,” which the court viewed as “completely dependent on a 
person’s subjective opinion.” Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Claims using terms such as “substantially” and “close to,” however, 
are routinely upheld as definite. See Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elec., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 821 
(Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 215. See supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
 216. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533 (1966) (“It is true, of course, that one of 
the purposes of the patent system is to encourage dissemination of information concerning 
discoveries and inventions.”). 
 217. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 278 (1977) (explaining that patents allow competitors to inform each other of 
their innovations, thus reducing duplicative investment in work already done). 
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practicing the invention cannot make informed decisions about how to work 
around it.218 
C.  Faithfulness 
Closely related to the dimension of clarity is faithfulness.  The claims of 
a patent are analogous to the “metes and bounds” of a real property deed 
that “distinguish the inventor’s intellectual property from the surrounding 
terrain.”219  In this way, the “claims establish a “conceptual perimeter 
around the invention.”220  This conceptual perimeter is known as claim 
scope.221 
A patent’s faithfulness refers to whether its claims completely and 
accurately describe—or are “faithful” to—the scope of the underlying 
invention.  A faithful claim is congruent with the scope of its underlying 
invention.  An unfaithful claim, on the other hand, captures something 
more, less, or different than what was actually invented.  So described, the 
faithfulness dimension encompasses three problematic scenarios:  
overbroad scope, overnarrow scope, and otherwise inaccurate scope. 
Claims that are overbroad assert rights to something more than what was 
actually invented.  An example of overclaiming can be found in In re 
Wright,222 which involved a claim on a vaccine on all pathogenic RNA 
viruses, where the only invention disclosed in the patent was a vaccine that 
conferred immunity in chickens against one type of RNA tumor virus.223  It 
is fundamental to American patent law that there is no patent protection for 
something that was not invented.224  This prohibition is reflected in multiple 
patent law doctrines, including the enablement and written description 
requirements of patentability.  These requirements focus on a patent’s 
specification, which is considered relevant to claim scope as a result of the 
maxim that a PHOSITA is deemed to read claims in the context of the 
entire patent.225  The enablement doctrine requires that the specification 
describe “the manner and process of making and using” the disclosed 
 
 218. To work around a patent is to “achieve the technological benefits of the patent 
without duplicating the particular steps constituting it and thus without infringement.” 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 295 (2003). 
 219. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent 
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 845 (1990). 
 220. Timothy Chen Saulsbury, Pioneers Versus Improvers:  Enabling Optimal Patent 
Claim Scope, 16 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 439, 445 (2010). 
 221. Id. 
 222. 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
 223. Id. at 1560–62. 
 224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to grant patent rights to 
inventors); 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (limiting the grant of patent rights to those who are 
inventors); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the 
Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157, 1178 (2004) (“It is fundamental to 
American patent law that patentees are not entitled to protection for what they either did not 
invent or did not disclose to the public.”). 
 225. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313–14 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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invention.226  The written description doctrine requires that the specification 
allow PHOSITAs to recognize that the inventor invented what is 
claimed.227 
In practice, neither doctrine has managed to eliminate the problem of 
overbroad claims.  The enablement doctrine has traditionally been limited 
to the so-called unpredictable arts—e.g., life sciences and chemicals.228  
Meanwhile, the written description requirement has traditionally been 
limited to preventing late claiming of new matter.229  In any event, as 
explained by one scholar, both doctrines are “confusing and badly 
fractured.”230  As a result, traditional scope-limiting patent doctrines and 
practices are unable to reach every instance of overclaiming.  Moreover, 
they only come into play when a claim is challenged.231 
While the problems of overbroad claims are well documented, those 
associated with underclaiming and otherwise inaccurate claiming generally 
receive less attention.  But that was not always the case.  Indeed, the 
practice of underclaiming and erroneous claiming by unscrupulous patent 
prosecutors was a source of intense public concern in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s.232  And it was partly in response to the perceived proliferation 
of these kinds of patents that Congress and the PTO established a regulatory 
system—unique in all of administrative law—that restricts who may 
prosecute patents.233 
Although this regulatory system helped curb the most egregious 
professional abuses, mistakes persist.  An example of erroneous 
underclaiming234 is the case of Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, 
LLP,235 which involved an extra limitation in a claim that rendered it so 
narrow as to be practically worthless.236  Mistakes of otherwise inaccurate 
claiming also occur.  An example is the case of Chef America, Inc. v. Lamb-
 
 226. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
 227. Id. (requiring a written description); Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 
1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (interpreting the statutory requirement). 
 228. See Bernard Chao, The Infringement Continuum, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014). 
 229. See id. (manuscript at 19 n.83). 
 230. Id. (manuscript at 17). 
 231. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1501 (estimating that roughly 2 percent of all patents 
are ever litigated, and less than two-tenths of 1 percent of all issued patents actually go to 
court). 
 232. See Guerrini, supra note 157, at 332–37 (2012) (describing the growing chorus of 
disapproval of prosecution practices that were believed to rob inventors of the full scope of 
the patent rights to which they were entitled); Kara W. Swanson, The Emergence of the 
Professional Patent Practitioner, 50 TECH. & CULTURE 519, 529–30 (2009) (same). 
 233. See Guerrini, supra note 157, at 331–38. 
 234. To be clear, the attribute of underbreadth described in this Article is limited to 
instances of unintentional underclaiming.  It does not address instances of intentional 
underclaiming. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 556 
(2010) (explaining that some patentees intentionally underclaim in order to dedicate subject 
matter to the public). 
 235. 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 236. Specifically, the claim at issue described the invention as “consisting of” certain 
elements, where “consisting of” in patent law means limited only to these elements, although 
the invention was not in fact limited to those elements. See id. at 1283. 
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Weston, Inc.,237 which involved a claim for producing a light and flaky 
crust.238  The claim mistakenly required heating the dough, rather than the 
oven, to a temperature of 400°F to 850°F, which would have caused the 
dough to burn to a crisp.239 
Procedures exist to correct errors of underclaiming and inaccurate 
claiming.  For one, patentees may broaden overnarrow claims during 
reissue proceedings at the PTO.240  However, broadening reissues must be 
sought within two years of the grant of the patent,241 and reissued material 
is effective in some cases only as to causes of action arising after the 
reissuance date.242  Minor drafting mistakes may be corrected via 
certificates of correction, but a correction certification also has a delayed 
effective date.243  Otherwise, the mismatch between claim scope and 
invention scope can be corrected through judicial claim construction.244  
But the courts are not always so helpful when they interpret claims.245 
As with the clarity dimension, stakeholder interests are not aligned on the 
faithfulness dimension.  Overbroad claims expand the scope of conduct that 
is deemed infringing, and so long as they avoid invalidating prior art and 
otherwise go unchallenged, patentees associate them with good patent 
quality.246  But patentees disfavor overnarrow and otherwise inaccurate 
claims because the rights that attach to them are less than or different from 
those that would attach to the true invention.  Meanwhile, the PTO, the 
courts, and the public disfavor all instances where claim scope does not 
match the true scope of the underlying invention claims.  Aside from the 
likely invalidity of such claims, these stakeholders would prefer to reduce 
 
 237. 358 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 238. Id. at 1372. 
 239. Id. at 1373–74. 
 240. 35 U.S.C. §§ 251–252 (2012).  The proceeding is also available to narrow the scope 
of a claim as a result of overclaiming. See id. 
 241. Id. § 251(d).  As illustrated in the Immunocept case, some errors of underclaiming 
are not identified within this two-year period and so remain uncorrected. Immunocept, 504 
F.3d at 1283 (explaining that the patent issued in 1996, but the drafting error was not 
discovered until 2002, long after the two-year window had closed). 
 242. 35 U.S.C. § 252 (providing that a reissued patent can be enforced against infringing 
activity that occurred from the time the original patent was issued only if the claims of the 
original and reissue patents are “substantially identical”).  Moreover, persons who practice 
the reissued patent may have intervening rights that are a defense to patent infringement. See 
id. (codifying the defenses of absolute and equitable intervening rights). 
 243. 35 U.S.C. § 255 (providing that the corrected patent is effective only as to causes of 
action arising after the correction).  For causes of action arising before that date, the patent 
must be considered without the benefit of the correction. Novo Indus. v. Micro Molds Corp., 
350 F.3d 1348, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 244. See Menell et al., supra note 154, at 770–72 (describing courts’ authority to correct 
mistakes in patents through the claim construction process and providing examples). 
 245. See, e.g., Chef Am., Inc. v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 358 F.3d 1371, 1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (construing a claim for producing a light and flaky crust that required heating the 
dough “to a temperature in the range of about 400°F to 850°F” to refer to dough temperature 
rather than oven temperature even though that construction produced the nonsensical result 
that the dough would be burned to a crisp (emphasis omitted)). 
 246. See generally Yelderman, supra note 169. 
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the instances in which patentees call upon the PTO and courts to correct 
scope issues and adjudicate malpractice disputes. 
Further, the public has agreed to give patentees rights of exclusion to 
exactly—and only—what was actually invented.  Overbroad claims exclude 
the public from technological spaces in which they otherwise might freely 
be able to move.  Overbroad claims also can have a chilling effect on those 
who would otherwise be inclined to investigate related forms of the 
invention that the patentee did not actually invent.247  Overnarrow and 
otherwise inaccurate claims, on the other hand, cheat the patentee of certain 
rights of exclusion to which she is entitled, which is demoralizing and may 
discourage her from innovating in the future or from disclosing her 
inventions to the public. 
D.  Social Utility 
Moving from the patent document to its underlying invention, the fourth 
dimension is the social utility of the invention.  There are two general 
sources of social utility:  the nature of the invention and the technological 
progress represented by the invention.  The nature of an invention can be 
such that its social utility is obvious; the discovery of a cure for a life-
threatening disease that afflicts a large population, for example, is clearly 
beneficial to society.  The social utility of other inventions, however, is 
more elusive; the patent on eyeglasses that attach to eyebrow piercings 
comes to mind.248 
Distinct from the nature of an invention is the technological progress that 
it represents.  “The patent system is a regime of technological 
evaluation”;249 that evaluation can and often does include a judgment that 
the invention described in a patent represents a revolutionary technological 
advance or, as is usually the case, a modest improvement over the existing 
technology.250  Such inventions are called, respectively, pioneers and 
improvements.251  Frequently cited examples of pioneer inventions are the 
sewing machine invented by Elias Howe, Jr., the electrical telegraph 
invented by Samuel Morse, and the telephone invented by Alexander 
Graham Bell.252 
There is a general consensus that pioneer inventions are crucial to the sort 
of technological advance that the patent system is designed to encourage.  
Because pioneer inventions have the most significant impact on society, 
“[t]hey are the inventions with which we are most familiar, and those we 
 
 247. Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 158 (2006). 
 248. U.S. Patent No. 6,557,994 B1 (filed July 18, 2002). 
 249. John R. Thomas, The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 36 (1995). 
 250. Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 561–62 (1898) (defining a 
pioneer patent as one “covering a function never before performed, a wholly novel device, or 
one of such novelty and importance as to mark a distinct step in the progress of the art, as 
distinguished from a mere improvement or perfection of what had gone before”). 
 251. Brian J. Love, Interring the Pioneer Invention Doctrine, 90 N.C. L. REV. 379, 393 
(2012). 
 252. Westinghouse, 170 U.S. at 562. 
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care most about.”253  In other words, pioneer inventions have outsized 
social utility. 
All patented inventions must have some utility in order to satisfy the 
utility standard of patentability,254 but the bar set by that standard is 
exceptionally low.255  All patented inventions must also be nonobvious, but 
the bar set by that standard also can be low and, according to some, is not 
consistently applied.256  A patented pioneer invention’s usefulness to 
society far exceeds what is required by law, and for this reason, the public 
associates it with good patent quality.257 
While the PTO and courts may be neutral with respect to utility derived 
solely from the nature of an invention since that utility does not necessarily 
impact their functions, patentees associate patents on socially important 
inventions with good patent quality to the extent that they translate into 
money or power in the marketplace.  With respect to utility derived from an 
invention’s technological progress, the opinions of these stakeholders may 
be stronger.  With pioneer inventions, there is little to no prior art that must 
be avoided and so patents on them are typically broad in scope.258  
Patentees therefore associate such patented inventions with good patent 
quality because they allow for greater operational freedom and competitive 
leverage than do typical improvement patents.  Relatedly, the PTO and the 
courts may favor pioneer inventions because validity issues relating to 
patents on these inventions may take less time and resources to resolve, as 
there are fewer prior art references to consider.259  On the other hand, 
 
 253. Thomas, supra note 249, at 37. 
 254. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (requiring patented inventions to be “useful”). 
 255. That standard requires patented inventions to “operate as described and potentially 
provide some de minimis public benefit.” See Risch, supra note 180, at 58. 
 256. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity:  The Supreme Court’s 
Failure To Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 323, 324 (2008) (explaining that obviousness decisions are “inconsistent 
and unpredictable”); Gregory R. Baden, Note, Third-Party Assistance in Determining 
Obviousness, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1213–14 (2011) (proposing a third-party obviousness 
specialist to bring greater consistency to the obviousness determination). 
 257. There is, however, some disagreement as to the proper scope of patent rights that 
should attach to pioneer inventions.  Robert Merges and Richard Nelson have argued that in 
many industries, the efficiency gains from granting broad patent protection to pioneer 
inventions are likely outweighed by the loss of competition for improvements of those 
inventions. Merges & Nelson, supra note 219, at 843–44.  The patent laws should therefore 
“attempt at the margin to favor a competitive environment for improvements.” Id. at 843.  
Other scholars have argued that expanding the scope of protection afforded to patents on 
pioneer inventions is appropriate given, among other things, the steep refinement costs and 
high risks associated with such inventions. See Love, supra note 251, at 405. 
 258. See Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“[P]ioneers acquire broader claims than non-pioneers who must craft narrow claims to 
evade the strictures of a crowded art field.”); Love, supra note 251, at 417 (explaining that 
pioneer inventions can be claimed using broad language, because they “open up new fields 
in which little or no prior art exists”). 
 259. Cf. Love, supra note 251, at 426–27 (explaining the claim that the PTO is unlikely to 
reject applications on pioneer invention claims on grounds of validity because there are so 
few prior art patents to consider). 
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because the field being described is entirely new, it may be more difficult to 
interpret such patents.260 
E.  Commercial Success 
Inventions can have commercial value distinct from their social utility.  
For example, an invention that is selected as an industry standard may have 
a commercial value that far exceeds its technological achievement.  In the 
setting of industry standards, there are usually alternatives from which to 
choose, although the technological differences between them may be 
insignificant.261  Yet the selected solution will have much greater 
commercial value than the rejected solutions by virtue of its identification 
as the standard.  And if that solution is patented, the patentee will be able to 
extract supranormal royalties from industry participants who seek to—
indeed, must—use it.262 
Conversely, a new orphan drug to treat a rare medical disease may be 
extraordinarily valuable to those affected by the disease.  But by virtue of 
the small size of that population, such drugs will in many cases be 
unprofitable in the absence of government intervention.263  On the other end 
of the spectrum are inventions that have no market at all.  The once-
patented “beerbrella” to shade one’s cold beverage on a sunny day, for 
instance, is an oft-cited example of an invention having no commercial 
viability.264  Notably, the beerbrella may exemplify the rule rather than the 
exception; 50 percent or more of all patented inventions in the United States 
are likely never commercially exploited.265 
There is currently no requirement in patent law that a patented invention 
be commercially significant.  To the contrary, the patent system embraces 
the fact that some patented inventions will have no commercial value by, 
among other things, encouraging the early filing of patents before a market 
 
 260. See id. at 410–11 (explaining the PTO’s potential difficulty in understanding pioneer 
inventions due to the limitations of language in describing something that is entirely new). 
 261. Patrick J. Flinn, Why FRAND Matters, 25 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 8, 9 (2013). 
 262. See Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 310 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 263. The Orphan Drug Act of 1983 incentivizes the development of orphan drugs. See 
Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified in scattered sections of 
21, 26, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).  Eligible drugs are those that treat any rare disease or condition 
that affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States or “for which there is no 
reasonable expectation that the cost of developing and making available in the United States 
a drug for such disease or condition will be recovered from sales in the United States of such 
drug.” 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012). 
 264. See, e.g., Crazy Patents!, FPO:  IP RES. & COMMUNITIES, 
http://www.freepatentsonline.com/crazy.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (citing the 
beerbrella patent, U.S. Patent No. 6,637,447 (filed Oct. 19, 2001), as an example of a 
“crazy” patent having minimal utility and no commercially viability).  The invention has 
apparently never been commercialized even though the patent on it has long been expired. 
See Patent Application Information Retrieval, USPTO.GOV, http://portal.uspto.gov/pair/
PublicPair (last visited Apr. 26, 2014) (select “Patent Number” under “Search for 
Application:  Choose type of number;” then search “6,637,447”) (confirming that the patent 
expired due to nonpayment of maintenance fees). 
 265. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 362–63 & nn.121–
29 (2001). 
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for their inventions has been identified.266  To the extent that an invention is 
a commercial success because of the technological leap that it represents, 
stakeholders associate this dimension with good patent quality for the same 
reasons described in the preceding subsection.  But it is unclear whether the 
PTO, courts, and society prefer commercially successful inventions that 
represent much more modest technological improvements, such as 
inventions described in some standards essential patents. 
Patentees highly value patents on commercially successful inventions 
regardless of the magnitude of their contributions to society.  All patent 
claims have value by virtue of the legal rights that attach to them, and that 
value can be exploited in various ways.  But patents on inventions that 
create or enhance consumer demand or provide a supply-side benefit, such 
as reducing manufacturing costs, are that much more valuable to their 
owners and therefore likely to be associated with good patent quality 
because others will likely want to practice those inventions.  Patentees can 
turn that demand into dollars by licensing or selling the patents, using them 
offensively to limit competition, or using them defensively to buy 
operational freedom. 
VI.  IMPLICATIONS 
The foregoing sections operationalize the concept of patent quality by 
framing it in terms of dimensions valued by stakeholders.  This Part 
summarizes the implications of that work.  Broadly, it demonstrates that the 
meaning of patent quality is far richer than most in the patent community 
previously have recognized.  Going forward, commentators and 
policymakers are urged to be more thoughtful—as well as transparent—
about their definitional choices. 
More specifically, this Article describes a fundamentally different 
approach to patent quality’s meaning that is essentially the inverse of the 
conventional way of thinking about the concept.  This new approach puts 
“first things first” and asks what it means for a patent to be good quality 
without regard to the existing standards of patentability.  Describing this 
new approach is the first step toward constructing a metric for patent 
quality that ultimately can be used to determine the extent of the so-called 
quality crisis, evaluate the success or failure of quality reforms, and think 
strategically about ways to improve quality. 
A.  Inverting the Conventional Approach 
This Article concludes that a comprehensive definition of patent quality 
takes into account five dimensions of patents and the inventions they 
describe.  Recall the basic formula for total patent quality (TQ) described in 
Part III.B: 
TQ = (M1)(D1) + (M2)(D2) . . . . 
 
 266. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (awarding U.S. patents to those who are first to publicly 
disclose their inventions). 
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Incorporating the five quality dimensions into the basic formula results in 
the following: 
TQ = (MV)(V) + (MC)(C) + (MF)(F) + (MSU)(SU) + (MCS)(CS) 
where V refers to a patent’s probable validity, C refers to the patent’s 
clarity, F refers to the patent’s faithfulness to its underlying invention, SU 
refers to the invention’s social utility, and CS refers to the invention’s 
commercial success.  The multiplier reflecting each dimension’s relative 
importance is indicated by a unique variable M. 
This understanding of the meaning of patent quality is a result of a 
definitional approach that is essentially the inverse of how many in the 
patent community define patent quality, which is solely in terms of 
conformance with legal standards.  A fundamental problem with the 
conventional approach is that it relies on circular reasoning:  it concludes 
that a good patent is one that is legally valid because a legally valid patent 
is good quality.  It does not consider the question of whether the legal 
standards of patentability are—or even can be—themselves calibrated and 
applied to reflect good patent quality in the first place. 
As described in Part III.A, commercial product specifications can be 
analogized to the legal standards of patentability in that both dictate 
acceptable design parameters.  As the business sector discovered some 
decades ago, a quality judgment based solely on conformance to 
specifications will not always be accurate.  A product can perfectly conform 
to specs, yet it may still be bad quality if the specifications are poorly 
designed.267  For this reason, firms have invested heavily in calibrating their 
products’ specifications to better achieve the desired quality outcomes.268 
It is time for the way the patent community thinks about the relationship 
between patent quality and legal standards to similarly evolve.  A definition 
of patent quality that is focused only on compliance with legal standards is 
limited and potentially irrelevant because it relies on the assumption that 
those standards are calibrated and being applied to reflect good patent 
quality.  More than a few members of the patent community doubt that they 
are.  Some have argued, for example, that the definiteness standard is not 
set where it should be,269 while others contend that the obviousness 
standard is inconsistently applied.270  That these are problems in the patent 
system is well known.  That they are, fundamentally, patent quality 
problems is not yet fully appreciated. 
 
 267. See Forker, supra note 85, at 73 (explaining Taguchi’s insight that if an original 
product design does not account for environmental, manufacturing, and consumer usage 
stresses, the finished product may not perform well or reliably). 
 268. See, e.g., FRANK R. KARDES ET AL., CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 12 (2011) (explaining that 
Proctor & Gamble spends millions to determine consumer needs and design products that 
respond to them). 
 269. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE:  ALIGNING PATENT 
NOTICE AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 94–100 (2011) (criticizing the Federal Circuit’s 
“insolubly ambiguous” standard for definiteness and urging its adoption of a more stringent 
standard in order to improve notice to the public). 
 270. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
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The approach followed here puts “first things first” and asks what it 
means for a patent to be good quality without regard to the substance of the 
validity standards.  This allows for a deeper inquiry into the definition that 
is not artificially bounded by those standards.  It also has the effect of 
redirecting the policy focus from a narrow one of increasing the number of 
probably valid patents to the more relevant one of increasing the number of 
good-quality patents. 
For Congress, the PTO, and others interested in increasing U.S. patent 
quality, following this new approach will mean developing and 
implementing policy proposals in addition to those intended to increase a 
patent’s probability of being held valid if challenged.  Proposals that 
increase patents’ probability of validity include giving patent applicants the 
option of “gold-plating” their patents by subjecting their applications to 
rigorous examination.271  Applications that survive this heightened review 
process would be accorded a strong presumption of validity, meaning that 
courts would not be allowed to second-guess decisions based on prior art 
reviewed by the examiner or to consider new prior art that is redundant.272 
Implementing this proposal would have the effect of increasing 
performance along the probable validity dimension since patents that carry 
a greater presumption of validity—by definition—are more likely to be held 
valid if challenged.  But a validity-focused proposal is not alone sufficient 
to increase patent quality.  After all, patent quality that is defined solely in 
terms of probable validity could be maximized simply by adopting a rule 
that a patent’s validity can never be challenged.  Few, however, likely 
would agree that adopting such a rule would improve the quality of U.S. 
patents. 
Efforts to increase patent quality should therefore contemplate 
maximizing patent performance along the other four quality dimensions.  
An obvious way to do so is by amending the standards of patentability.  For 
instance, Congress might change the statutory language describing the 
definiteness standard to require greater clarity than is currently required.273  
But it may be more efficient to increase patent performance along the 
clarity dimension through the manipulation of other policy levers.  
Alternative policy levers include, for example, requiring PTO examiners to 
record how the boundaries of patented property are refined during the 
process of examination,274 and requiring patent applicants to use 
standardized claim templates, provide glossaries of terms, and designate 
 
 271. See Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 46, at 61–62. 
 272. Id. at 62.  Another policy proposal that increases patents’ probability of validity is 
giving deference to tribunals’ prior validity decisions.  According to this proposal, if a claim 
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claims to “unambiguously” point out and claim the invention. 
 274. See Petherbridge, supra note 27, at 189. 
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default dictionaries in their applications.275  This Article takes no position 
on the best way to optimize performance along the various quality 
dimensions.  The point, rather, is that there are often ways to do so beyond 
recommending that Congress change the text of the standards or urging the 
courts to adopt a new interpretation of that text. 
B. Pursuing Quality Strategically 
The new definitional approach described here not only promotes 
informed policymaking, but it also promotes strategic policymaking.  To 
maximize the effectiveness of any plans to improve patent quality, 
policymakers should follow the lead of business and adopt a strategic 
approach to quality improvement efforts.  Depending on the circumstances, 
it may not be possible, necessary, or efficient to attempt to measure or 
optimize performance along every dimension.  When this is the case, the 
rational reform strategy is to focus on improving performance along those 
quality dimensions that will result in the largest quality gains at the least 
cost. 
Returning to the variables identified in Part III.B, one of the most 
efficient ways to maximize the impact of quality-improvement efforts is to 
focus on improving performance along dimensions having the largest 
multipliers.  A second way is to focus on improving performance along 
dimensions that are positive reinforcers of other dimensions—preferably 
those having the largest multipliers.276  Conversely, an inefficient quality 
strategy is to focus on improving performance along dimensions having the 
smallest multipliers or that negatively reinforce other dimensions—
especially those having large multipliers.  To illustrate with a simple 
example, if the multiplier for the clarity dimension is significantly greater 
than the multiplier for the commercial success dimension, the efficient 
policy plan should focus on increasing the clarity of patents rather than 
ensuring the commercial success of the inventions they describe.  And if 
improvement along the clarity dimension positively reinforces improvement 
along the commercial success dimension, there is even more reason to 
pursue this plan.  Stated in management theory terms, efforts to improve 
patent quality as a whole should favor policies focused on improvement in 
the quality niche occupied by the clarity dimension over the quality niche 
occupied by the social utility dimension. 
Admittedly, this analysis cannot be conducted without a clear 
understanding of the costs associated with pursuing quality along each 
dimension.  But it is beyond the scope of this Article to attempt to quantify 
those costs.  The aim here is to describe a systematic approach to the 
meaning of patent quality and to demonstrate that patent quality can and 
should be a strategic pursuit.  It does not argue for or against any particular 
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policy agenda.  Going forward, however, it would be worthwhile to study 
the marginal costs and benefits of performing well along each quality 
dimension for the purpose of developing efficient strategies to increase 
overall patent quality. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article represents the first scholarly attempt to deconstruct the 
meaning of patent quality.  It does so by using a methodology applied in the 
business literature of quality management.  The implications of this work 
include a new appreciation for the multidimensional nature of the concept, a 
fundamental reorientation of policymaking efforts to focus on patent quality 
as defined by quality dimensions rather than validity standards, and a 
proposed formula for assessing patent quality that can be used to develop a 
strategic quality plan.  Although several aspects of the analysis merit further 
study, including the costs of pursuing quality along each dimension, this 
Article lays the groundwork for that research, and in so doing, brings 
needed clarity and direction to the patent quality agenda. 
 
